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1. Introduction 
Two commonly held beliefs are that macroeconomic conditions are a relevant 
determinant of election results, and that governments prefer to stay in office rather than out 
of it. As a result one should also consider that governments’ economic policies are 
determined by both economic and political considerations. Over the years a significant body 
of economic and political literature has tried to analyze voters and governments’ behaviour 
in order to unveil the exact nature of the relationship between politics and the economy. 
This paper explores the political determinants of fiscal policy choices. If cutting taxes 
and entering on a sort of spending frenzy can bring electoral advantages to politicians, then 
they will actually do it, or at least try to do it. This and other more sophisticated assumptions 
are put to the test by a vast literature, but in general, an inherent weakness of a significant 
portion of these studies is that they rely on highly aggregated data, namely total 
expenditures, total revenues, current expenditures, capital expenditures or public deficits. 
With this type of data nothing can be said about the way governments allocate their 
expenditures inside those broad aggregates, hence, the picture researchers are getting is hazy. 
Assuming that governments actually increase spending in election years, we might 
immediately ask: in what areas are they spending more? Which components are preferred? 
Probably not all expenditure components are increased because we know that between 
buying more submarines or increasing the wages of public servants there is a difference in 
terms of the electoral output that is generated by each choice. Furthermore, finding evidence 
(or not) of political manipulations in total expenditures, total revenues or public deficits does 
not assure similar conclusions when checking inside these big aggregates. This means that 
the exploration of political cycles on the sub-levels of government expenditures is 
empirically relevant and can provide a better understanding of the subject. Moreover, by 
analyzing the vast range of expenditures that are at the disposal of governments, we are put a 
step closer to the reality of fiscal choices and policies. 
Only a few papers have looked, in the political perspective, to where and how the 
main components of public expenditures and revenues are allocated (see, for instance: 
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Potrafke, 2010; Katsimi and Sarantides, 2012; Enkelman and Leibrecht, 2013; Morozoumi et 
al., 2014; and Castro and Martins, 2016). In this paper we go as far and as deep as the 
available data allows us to analyse whether electoral motives and government ideology can 
be observed at deeper disaggregated levels of public expenditures in a set of developed 
countries. This also allows us to investigate if there are redistribution of expenditures within 
each component, as some areas that are less important electorally may actually display a loss 
in expenditures during electoral years due to the need that opportunistic governments have to 
reinforce spending in areas that are more effective for gathering votes. This hypothesis is 
coherent with the moral hazard approach to political budget cycles (Persson and Tabellini, 
2000; Shi and Svensson, 2002a). The assumption here is that the government can exert an 
almost hidden effort, in the sense that, by redistributing expenditures from areas to which 
people pay less attention to others that they are more aware, they are effectively trying to 
signal competence. Hence, using data for 18 European countries over the period 1990-2012, 
we test for the presence of those effects in the functional components and sub-components of 
public expenditures. This represents an important step forward relatively to the previous 
literature, as it allows us to identify (and understand) which items inside the main 
components of public expenditure are indeed being (or not) politically manipulated by 
incumbents. A comparison between some sub-groups of countries is also provided. 
An LSDVC estimator is used in the empirical analysis and the results point out to the 
presence of political opportunism at the aggregated and disaggregated levels of public 
expenditures, but no significant evidence of partisan or other political effects is found. The 
expenditure components that have proved to be more related to that behaviour are public 
services, education, social protection and some sub-components of health expenditure. These 
are expenditure components that include items that tend to generate more visible outcomes 
to voters, which might justify why they are preferred. Hence, a more disaggregated analysis 
is provided as a way of identifying those components and clarifying that issue. 
  4 
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the relevant 
literature. Section 3 describes the data and the econometric model. The results are shown and 
discussed in section 4. Robustness checks are provided in section 5 and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
The political business cycles and partisan theories explain how governments affect 
macroeconomic outcomes. The political business cycles theories are divided into models that 
assume agents with adaptive expectations (Nordhaus, 1975) and more recent models that 
adopt rational expectations (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; and Rogoff, 1990). The main 
implication of these theories is that all politicians implement expansionary policies before 
elections with the objective of maximizing their electoral support and after the elections 
contractionary measures are required to correct the artificial unbalance generated previously. 
However, the assumption of rational agents tends to reduce this ability of policymakers to 
induce the political cycle. Empirical studies suggest that favourable economic conditions 
benefit governments (Hibbs, 2006) but the issue of where and whether opportunistic 
behaviour exists is still open to debate among scholars. On the one hand, some argue that 
political business cycles are a phenomenon more present in developing countries and 
younger democracies (see, for instance, Shi and Svensson, 2006; Brender and Drazen, 2008; 
and Vergne, 2009). On the other hand, De Haan and Klomp (2013) examining the literature 
that deals with electoral fiscal policy manipulation consider that there is substantial evidence 
of political budget cycles in established democracies, although pointing out that “in younger 
democracies the political budget cycle is more likely to occur and is more likely to be 
stronger than in more mature democracies.”. 
Alternatively, both the adaptive (Hibbs, 1977) and rational (Alesina, 1987; Alesina 
and Sachs, 1988) versions of the partisan theory view politicians as heterogeneous, arguing 
that different parties have different policy objectives, behaving, when in office, in a partisan 
manner. Specifically, left-wing parties are relatively more concerned with unemployment 
(growth) than with inflation, whereas right-wing parties are especially worried with inflation 
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control. In general, empirical evidence points out that partisan behaviour seems to be more 
recurrent in developed countries (see Alesina et al., 1992, 1997). 
The aim of this paper is to test for the presence of politically motivated cycles in the 
components of public expenditures. Governments’ fiscal policy has been an important topic 
in the political and economic literature. Hence, the extension of the traditional approaches to 
fiscal policy is straightforward: boosts in expenditures and/or revenue reductions prior to 
elections should signal opportunistic behaviour, while in the partisan perspective left-wing 
governments are more prone to budget deficits than their counterparts. Rogoff and Sibert’s 
(1988) seminal model of political budgetary cycles is an adverse selection model underlining 
competence and asymmetric information. A further refinement made by Rogoff (1990) 
highlighted the need to search budgetary cycles inside the broad aggregates, especially in the 
composition of government spending. The model considered that the most efficient way for 
governments to signal competence is to divert spending from capital spending to current 
spending, thus favouring transfers and more visible programs. The idea is to increase those 
expenditures that send the strongest competence signals to the electorate and preferably 
those that are also noticeable immediately. 
Both at national and multi-national level, empirical studies show evidence of political 
fiscal policy manipulation. Shi and Svensson (2002a, b; 2006), using multi-country data, 
captures political budget cycles and show that the effect is significantly stronger in less 
developed countries. For a set of developed countries, Persson and Tabellini (2003) find a 
political revenue cycle but not a political cycle in expenditures, budget or transfers. Focusing 
on EU countries, Andrikopoulos et al. (2004) also do not find a fiscal electoral cycle. 
However, Mink and de Haan (2006) report a budget deficit increase in electoral years in EU 
members and that left governments are more prone to deficits than their counterparts. 
Efthyvoulou (2012) also concludes that governments across the EU tend to generate 
budgetary opportunistic cycles, but that these tend to be larger in the Eurozone countries. 
In this paper, we go inside the main budget aggregates and analyze whether political 
motives can be observed at deeper levels of European countries’ public expenditures. 
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Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), Veiga and Veiga (2007), Drazen and Eslava (2010), 
Aidt et al. (2011) and Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2011) found political opportunism at 
aggregated and disaggregated levels of public expenditures in Russia, Portugal, Colombia 
and Brazil, but restricted to the local/municipal level of government.
1
 
At the national level, the results found by Blais and Nadeau (1992) for Canadian 
regions suggest a short pre-electoral cycle on road expenditures and social services. Also 
considering an economic decomposition of public expenditures, Katsimi and Sarantides 
(2012) and Morozoumi et al. (2014) show that elections shift public spending towards 
current expenditures at the cost of public investment using a panel of countries. Brender and 
Drazen (2013) also disaggregate public spending but building a composite index, which does 
not allow us to identify what spending components are affected and how in election years. 
Looking at functional components of public expenditures, Potrafke (2010) finds that 
incumbents increase the growth of public health expenditures in election years, while 
Enkelman and Leibrecht (2013) conclude that election cycles are mainly found in the new 
democracies of Eastern Europe and in categories such as social welfare, general public 
services, environmental protection and infrastructures. Finally, Castro and Martins (2016) 
found political opportunism in health, social welfare and general public services when 
analysing Portuguese public expenditures. 
In this paper, we take a step forward in the analysis of politically driven cycles by 
looking for their presence in a panel of European countries at the level of the functional 
components of government expenditures and, most importantly, at the deeper level of their 
sub-components. The exploration of political cycles in the sub-levels of government 
expenditures is expected to provide a better understanding of the politically motivated 
cycles. As far as we know, no other study has dig so deep inside public expenditures to 
unveil the hidden complexity of politically driven cycles. Furthermore, by analyzing the vast 
                                               
1 In particular, Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), Veiga and Veiga (2007) and Drazen and Eslava (2010) 
provide evidence of a strategic opportunistic behaviour in the composition of local/municipal (investment) 
expenditures, especially in highly visible items to the electorate: infrastructure spending, buildings, roads and 
general constructions. The evidence of opportunistic budget cycles at the local level as been ample and 
reinforced by more recent works like for instance Chortareas, et. al. (2016) and Klein and Sakurai (2015). 
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range of expenditure components at the disposal of governments, we can become more 
aware of the reality of fiscal choices and public policies. 
 
3. Data and model specification 
To explore the presence of opportunism and partisan effects in the composition of 
government expenditures, we collected annual data for 18 European countries over the 
period 1990-2012.
2
 These data were obtained from the Eurostat Database. 
The analysis developed in this study is based on a break-down of government 
expenditures as defined by the OECD in its Classification of the Functions of the 
Government (COFOG).
3
 It classifies government expenditure data from the System of 
National Accounts by the purpose for which the funds are used, also called functional 
decomposition. This data measures the general governments’ expenditures. Ideally, as De 
Haan et al. (1999) argue, we are better off using data for the Central Government as it relates 
to those expenditures that are directly controlled by government ministers. However, as far 
as we are concerned there is no data by functions available for the Central Government. 
Therefore, we assume that incumbents can control effectively both direct and indirect 
expenditures. The first-level of this classification splits public expenditures into ten 
functional components: (i) general public services; (ii) defence; (iii) public order and safety; 
(iv) economic affairs; (v) environmental protection; (vi) housing and community amenities; 
(vii) health; (viii) recreation, culture and religion; (ix) education; (x) social protection. The 
second-level disaggregates each first-level group into up to nine sub-components. The total 
general government expenditures (TotExpd) and each of those ten components (and 
respective sub-components) are used as dependent variables in this analysis.
4
 
                                               
2 The countries used in this study are: Austria (1995-2012), Belgium (1990-2012), Denmark (1990-2012), Finland 
(1990-2012), France (1995-2012), Germany (1991-2012), Greece (1990-2012), Iceland (1998-2012), Ireland (1990-
2012), Italy (1990-2012), Luxembourg (1990-2012), Netherlands (1995-2012), Norway (1990-2012), Portugal 
(1990-2012), Spain (1995-2012), Sweden (1995-2012), Switzerland (2005-2012), United Kingdom (1990-2012). 
3 See, for example, OECD (2015): Government at a Glance. 
4 See Table A.1 in Annex for the definition of each component and sub-component. 
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As starting point for our empirical specification we rely on the standard median 
voter/taxpayer model typically used by the literature to relate variations of public spending 
with economic, political and demographic factors (Bergstrom and Goodman 1973; Niskanen 
1979). This approach is based on the traditional representative voter/taxpayer’s Cobb-
Douglas demand function for government goods and services and from this framework 
researchers have derived a variety of empirical specifications.
5
 Mueller (1989) considers that 
most studies test some variant of the following median voter’s demand equation: 
                                                 (1) 
Where G is the level of government expenditures, or in other words, the public good to be 
demanded by the median voter; the price of the good is tm measured as the price of the tax 
share of the median income voter and Ym is the median income of the voter/taxpayer. Finally, 
Z is a vector of variables that reflect the tastes of the voter, typically demographic and/or 
socioeconomic variables
6
. The model assumes that public fiscal conduct aims to reflect the 
wishes of the median voter, as such much attention has been paid to crucial demand 
variables like price and income. In this paper, we take a different perspective and test if the 
provision of public goods depends not only on demand factors but also on the governments’ 
electoral and ideological agenda. Therefore, our primary focus is the Z part of the equation 
where we introduce variables to capture electoral, partisan and political motives behind the 
variations on public expenditures. To test for the predictions of the opportunistic and partisan 
theories on the components (and sub-components) of government expenditures we employ 
the following dynamic panel data model: 
LnExpdCit=α + γLnExpdCit-1 + δ1 lnGDPpcit + δ2 LnRelPrit + δ3 LnPopit + 
β1ElectYrit + β2LeftGovit + β3MajGovit +vi + ηt + eit                                  (2) 
where i=1,…,18, t=1990,…,2012 and the natural logarithm of ExpdCit represents the log of 
one of the components (or sub-component) of government expenditures. The coefficient on 
the lag of the dependent variable (γ) measures its persistence, while the coefficients β1, β2, β3 
                                               
5 See, for instance, Tridimas (1992) and Easaw and Garratt (2006). 
6 Tridimas (1992) proposed that the right-side of the equation should also include the relative prices. 
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measure, respectively, the impact of the opportunistic, partisan and political support effects 
on the expenditure components. To represent the median voter’s income (Y in the model) we 
use the real GDP per capita (GDPpc); and the relative prices (t in the model) are 
approximated by the ratio of the government final consumption deflator to the GDP deflator 
(RelPr). We also introduce the natural logarithm of the total population (Pop) to capture 
demographic effects. Regarding the remaining elements, νi is the individual effect of each 
country i, ηt captures the time effects and eit is the error term. 
One way in which our empirical model differentiates from the typical median voter 
model is by including the lagged dependent variable which consequently turns the δi 
coefficients in equation (2) into short-run elasticities. In specifying a dynamic model we are 
assuming that the level of expenditures desired by the median voter does not correspond 
immediately to the level of expenditures provided by the government, which means that we 
have a partial adjustment process. We can think of some public expenditures that are actually 
obligations like interest payments and social security and others that are fixed like those 
related to the physical stock and public servants, as such it is reasonable to assume that there 
may be different rates of adjustments for different expenditure components. We also assume 
that the public deflator is the same for all expenditure components, as there are no consistent 
data for each specific unit cost.The set of variables introduced in the model to control for 
potential opportunistic, partisan and political effects follows Alesina et al. (1997) and 
represent the following: (i) ElectYr is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the year 
of national legislative elections, and 0 otherwise; (ii) LeftGov is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 when there is hegemony or dominance of left-wing parties in the cabinet, and 
0 otherwise; and (iii) MajGov is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a single 
party or coalition has majority in the parliament, and 0 otherwise. The data for these 
variables were collected from the Comparative Political Data Set I.
7
 A complete description 
                                               
7 LeftGov was computed from the gov_party variable in the CPDS database (it is equal to 1 when gov_party is 
equal to 4 and 5, i.e. when there is dominance or hegemony of left-wing parties). MajGov was computed from 
the gov_type variable in the CPDS database (it is equal to 1 when gov_type is equal to 1, 2 and 3, i.e. 
government formed with a party(ies) with a majority of seats in the parliament). 
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of the variables and some descriptive statistics can be found in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the 
Annex. 
Opportunism can be present in any category of expenditures. However, following 
Rogoff (1990) - and some strong empirical evidence found in the literature (see for instance 
Blais and Nadeau 1992; Veiga and Veiga 2007) - we consider that those components that are 
more visible to voters like, for example, public services, health, education and social 
protection, may be the primary targets for opportunistic manipulations. As to the partisan 
variable LeftGov, we conjecture that the fiscal conservatism of right-wing parties and their 
greater willingness to deregulate the economy can contrast with the tendency for left 
governments to increase public spending, particularly in those components related with 
welfare programs. For instance, Kauder and Potrafke (2013) find that right-wing parties are 
more willing to mobilise private funds to co-fund higher education. Hence, a positive effect 
is expected for the variable LeftGov especially when it comes to expenditures related with 
the welfare state. Looking at the descriptive statistics (see Table A.2 in the Annex) we 
observe that, on average, the total real government expenditures per capita in the group of 
countries analysed is close to 14 thousand Euros, while the components in which 
governments tend to spend more are public services, economic affairs, health, education and 
social protection. Therefore, we expect that these components might be the ones in which the 
government has more margin to act politically. This is a hypothesis that we intend to test in 
our empirical analysis. 
Given the presence of individual effects νi, the model can be estimated assuming 
those effects as fixed or random. However, the lagged value of the dependent variable would 
be correlated with the error term even if the latter is not serially correlated. This implies that 
OLS estimates (random or fixed effects) will be biased and inconsistent. Although the fixed 
effects estimator gains consistency as the number of time periods increases, in our analysis 
its number is not big enough (T=23) to rely on its estimates. 
The estimators that take into account that bias can be grouped into: (i) instrumental 
variables estimators; (ii) and bias-corrected estimators. According to the large sample 
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properties of the generalized method of moments (GMM), the dynamic estimator proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) is adequate when there is a clear dominance of cross sections 
over time periods in the sample. This is not the case in our panel, in which the cross sectional 
dimension is small (N=18), and about the same as the number of time periods (T=23). This 
means that the dynamic panel data estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is not 
the most suitable procedure to solve the problem. More specifically, given our panel 
structure, it will also be biased if employed to this analysis. Hence, a bias-corrected 
estimator is more appropriated here. Therefore, we apply Bruno’s (2005a, b) bias-corrected 
least squares dummy variable estimator (LSDVC) for dynamic panel data models with small 
N (and not large enough T). In the regressions, we employ the Blundell and Bond (1998) 
estimator as the initial estimator. In this case, the instruments are collapsed as suggested by 
Roodman (2009), which makes sure that we avoid using invalid or too many instruments. 
Following Bloom et al. (2007), we undertake 50 repetitions of the procedure to bootstrap the 
estimated standard errors.
8
 The empirical results from panel data analysis using the LSDVC 
estimator are presented and discussed in the next section. 
 
4. Empirical results 
The results from the estimation of political opportunism and partisan effects in the 
components of public expenditures are reported in Table 1. We start by inspecting whether 
those effects are present at the aggregated level, i.e. in total general government 
expenditures. We use the natural logarithm of its real value per capita (LnTotExpd) as it 
allows us to easily and intuitively interpret the results in terms of percentages and mitigate 
possible heteroscedasticity problems in the error term (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 278). 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
                                               
8 Bootstrapping the standard errors is a common practice when this estimator is applied because Monte Carlo 
simulations proved that the analytical variance estimator performs poorly for large coefficients of the lagged 
dependent variable (see Bruno, 2005a, b). We should also stress that our results do not qualitatively change 
with more repetitions (100, 200 or even 500) or when either Arellano and Bond (1991) or Anderson and Hsiao 
(1982) estimators are used as initial estimators instead. 
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The results presented in column (1) show that governments increase total public 
expenditures (per capita) by about 1.2% in election years (ElectYr).
9
 These results are in line 
with the findings of other studies focusing on the EU (Mink and de Haan, 2006; and 
Efthyvoulou, 2012). Nevertheless, no effects are found in terms of government orientation 
(LeftGov) or political support (MajGov). Therefore, no matter whether a right-wing or left-
wing government is in office, or whether it has a ruling majority or not, the behaviour is 
always the same: acting opportunistically to increase the chances of winning the elections. 
Additionally, we also observe that public expenditures are behaving pro-cyclically – contrary 
to the Keynesian view – as they tend to increase (decrease) when the economic situation 
improves (deteriorates): for each 1% increase in the GDP per capita, total public 
expenditures per capita increase by 0.14% in the short-run (hence, the long-run income 
elasticity will be around 2.1%). This long-run elasticity is significantly larger than one 
suggesting a more than proportional increase of government expenditures with respect to 
economic activity, therefore confirming Wagner’s law. The demographic conditions, here 
measured by the natural logarithm of total population (LnPop), have a negative impact on 
total expenditures per capita. This means that when the population increases (or is bigger), 
government expenditure has to be divided by more people, hence, expenditure per capita is 
lower. Finally, no effect is found regarding the relative prices. 
Empirical studies using this level of data aggregation on fiscal variables clearly 
dominate the literature and, most of them, are consistently finding politically driven 
budgetary cycles. However, their findings do not say how policymakers use public 
expenditures to generate their expected outcome at the ballots. The results in column (1) do 
not allow us to figure out which components of public expenditures are being employed 
opportunistically near the elections. Moreover, they can also not guarantee the complete 
absence of partisan movements inside the total expenditure aggregate. 
Hence, following Rogoff (1990) – who has already highlighted the need to search 
budgetary cycles inside the broad aggregates, especially in the composition of government 
                                               
9 This represents only the short-run effect. Given the slow speed of adjustment, in the long-run the impact will 
be much higher: 19.4% (=0.012/(1-0.933)). 
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spending – we consider the ten functional components of government expenditures (as 
defined by the OECD) to uncover this reality. The results are presented in columns (2)-(11) 
of Table 1 and clearly indicate that the functional items in which expenditures are increased 
during elections are public services education and social protection.
10
 These are the 
components in which governments tend to spend more in proportion to the total expenditure 
(as it is clear in the descriptive statistics – see Table A.2). Hence, the results confirm our 
hypothesis: the bigger categories of public expenditure are especially targeted by 
opportunistic governments. The results also seem to conform with the theoretical 
expectations (except for health expenditure) because of the strong positive signalling to 
voters and the quick visibility that characterizes these categories. Nevertheless, only the 
reasons behind the opportunistic boost of public services seem a bit unclear. As this category 
includes transfers of a general character between different levels of government, it is 
possible that increased spending in this sub-category may be happening in election years 
because they may be related to the quick conclusion of infrastructures (at the local or 
regional level) that can be beneficial to the government’s popularity, or to other highly 
visible items like, for example, the sponsorship of cultural and/or recreational local events. 
However, similarly to the findings for total expenditures, no significant effects are 
found regarding the political orientation and support of the party(ies) in office. Expenditures 
on environmental protection and education are slightly higher when left-wing governments 
are in office, but the respective effects are only marginally significant. This means that 
spending preferences seem to converge across governments, while ideology retires to the 
background. 
When we look at the impact of the controllers, a good economic environment has the 
expected positive impact in most of the components, and after calculating the long-run 
elasticities we found that those that are greater than one are observed in health, environment, 
                                               
10 Like for total expenditures, the natural logarithm of each expenditure component is used as dependent 
variable, which makes its interpretation easier. In particular, during election years, spending in public services 
per capita is 3.6% higher. Moreover, smoothing the scale of measure of the dependent variable, using logs, can 
also mitigate possible heteroscedasticity problems in the error term (see Wooldridge, 2013, p. 278). 
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recreation and especially education, where the long-run income elasticity estimate is close to 
4%. As to the coefficient on the log of RelPr, it remains insignificant across all estimations. 
Regarding the demographic scale effect, we find that per capita expenditures on defence, 
environmental protection, recreation and education per capita decrease with population, 
probably because these are items in which economies of scale are easier to reach. 
Finally, total expenditure and all its components exhibit a reasonable degree of 
persistence, as the coefficient associated to the respective lagged dependent variables is 
always highly significant. This evidence supports the use of our dynamic panel framework. 
So far the results give some insights as to which components are being exploited 
electorally. However they also raise some interesting questions. First, what is exactly being 
manipulated by governments in those categories that exhibit a PBC? Second, the lack of a 
PBC in the health category is at odds with theoretical expectations and with most empirical 
evidence (see, for instance, Potrafke, 2010 and Castro and Martins, 2016). Third, the almost 
absence of partisan effects found so far is a puzzling result. Education, particularly 
expenditures related to mandatory schooling, the social protection of the unemployed and of 
those socially excluded for example, culture, health and other areas are normally seen as 
focus of special attention by left governments. Finally, besides the abnormal growth of 
expenditures in electoral years reported in column (1) and in other columns of the previous 
table, there may be also some redistribution of expenditures within each component. Some 
areas less important electorally may actually display a decrease in spending, allowing 
opportunistic governments to reinforce other areas that are electorally more effective. This 
hypothesis is coherent with the moral hazard approach to political budget cycles (Persson 
and Tabellini, 2000; Shi and Svensson, 2002a) as the assumption here is that the government 
can exert an almost hidden effort to effectively signal competence, in the sense that it 
redistributes expenditures from areas to which people pay less attention to others they are 
more aware of. To investigate these questions that remained from the analysis of table 1, we 
collected data on items or sub-components of each component of public expenditures 
available from the Eurostat database, even though they present a shorter time span (1995-
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2012) than the previous data and also some missing data for a few countries/components. 
Even so, we ended up with reasonably good sets of panel data for each sub-component, 
which allows us to proceed with a more fine-tuned analysis. The division into the 10 major 
components, discussed in table 1, can be seen as representing the broad objectives of the 
governments and the analysis of the sub-components will help us to detail the means by 
which those objectives are achieved (i.e. to get closer to the actual policies).The results are 
presented in Tables 2 and 3. The structure of the model used in these estimations is identical 
to the analysis for the first-level components, in the sense that each equation is related to the 
respective sub-component and estimated using the LSDVC estimator over the same political 
variables and controllers. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
Overall, with this more disaggregated data we now find the expected PBC in some of 
the health’s sub-components, and also get substantially more partisan effects which are in 
line with theoretical expectations. The evidence supporting the idea that there may be a 
redistribution of expenditures to signal competence is observed, but it is found to be weak. 
A primary interest regarding these results is to see the origin of public services’ 
electoral importance. Both Enkelman and Leibrecht (2013) and Castro and Martins (2016) 
find it to be strongly significant. Unfortunately, data on transfers of a general character 
between different levels of government (TransfGen) are missing or of poor quality for most 
countries, which made it impossible to test our earlier hypothesis. Available results show 
that the only statistically relevant sub-component is expenditures on executive and 
legislative organs, financial and fiscal affairs and external affairs (ExecAff) and that 
opportunism is the only effect found. When we look at the expenditures lodged in this sub-
item (see Eurostat, 2011), we conjecture that the management costs of public funds and 
public debt may be increasing in electoral years. That might be the case, not just because this 
sub-item is associated with the ability to increase spending in other categories but also 
because the Eurostat states that the interests connected to delayed debt payments are often 
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included in this sub-category. Debt payments in electoral years are probably not in the best 
interest of opportunistic governments as they tend to divert resources from electorally 
efficient spending. Another source of extra spending in this sub-category is related to 
physical amenities provided to the chief executive, the legislature and their aides, and to 
commissions and committees created by the chief executive. Normally politics intensifies in 
electoral years, so one should expect to see an increase in those expenditures, although, per 
se, they probably cannot account for a political cycle, more so because they may or may not 
be electorally driven. 
For the controllers the results are in line with the ones obtained in the PubServ 
equation in Table 1, but here we can observe the expected positive impact of LnGDPpc on 
some items of PubServ. 
Regarding the sub-components of expenditures on defence, the results indicate no 
presence of opportunistic, partisan or political support effects in any of them, which is in line 
with the findings reported in Table 1 for defence. However, when we look at the results for 
public order and economic affairs we are faced with two interesting surprises: even though 
no evidence of opportunism is found for each of those components, when we dig deeper we 
find that expenditures in police services (Police, in public order) and in agriculture, forestry, 
fishing and hunting (Agric in Economic Affairs) are significantly increased during election 
years (2.3% in the first sub-item and 5.8% in the second). Probably governments want to 
reinforce their popularity within the workforce of these sectors and also with the increased 
spending on police they want to signal competence and increase the voters’ sympathy 
towards them by assuring more general safety in election years. Despite left governments are 
likely to spend more in some economic affairs items, no other political effects are found and 
the signs and significance of the coefficients on the controllers are, in general, consistent 
with the ones reported in Table 1 for each of those two components. 
Regarding environmental protection items, there is some weak evidence that 
governments tend to spend less on waste water management and protection of biodiversity 
and landscape prior to the elections, maybe to divert funds to other items that more useful to 
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increase their chances of re-election thus supporting the idea that there may be a 
redistribution of expenditures to signal competence. Additionally, left governments seem to 
be more concerned with a few items inside this component (Protect and OthEnvir). On the 
contrary, no relevant electoral or ideological effects are found concerning housing and 
community amenities (see Table 3). 
With this more disaggregated data we find the expected PBC in some of health’s sub-
components and also some partisan effects despite no evidence is found for the component 
itself. Electoral manipulation can be seen in per capita expenditures in medical products, 
appliances and equipment (MedProd), hospital services (HospServ) and research and 
development in health (HlthRD). The strategy of providing better health care to the 
populations in election years is consistent with political opportunism as it can improve 
governments’ popularity in all segments of the voting population. Additionally, we also find 
some partisan effects: left-wing governments spend more on research and development in 
health (HlthRD) than centre or right-wing parties. Although these partisan results conform to 
the theoretical expectations, we should note that the regression for the component itself did 
not show any sign of opportunism or partisanship (see Table 1). It is only when we dig 
deeper in the analysis of its sub-components that we realise the real importance of the 
political opportunism and can extract some partisan effects. Taking into account not only the 
case of health expenditures, but also public order, economic affairs and environmental 
protection (analysed above), it seems that some of the more aggregated data conceal the 
political manipulation of public expenditures. It is only when we look “under the 
microscope” that we really become aware of some important aspects of government’s 
behaviour regarding fiscal policy. 
Recreation remains a component in which no significant political effects are found, 
even after disaggregating further, with the one exception that left-wing governments are 
more prone to spend more on culture. On the contrary, for education and social protection 
we have some interesting results. First, it has become clear that most of the opportunism on 
expenditures in education is related to an increase in pre-primary and primary education 
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(Prim) during election years. This is the basis of all educational system and voters tend to 
take a special attention and be very concerned with the quality of education of their young 
children (qualification of the teachers, infrastructures, materials,…). Second, some partisan 
effects are found for primary (Prim), secondary (Second) and general education expenditures 
not defined by level (Genr), sub-components of education in which left-wing governments 
tend to spend more. Third, our results also point out that majority governments are more 
prone than minority ones to cut expenditures at higher levels of education (Tert). 
Another universally accepted “good” policy that tends to provide dividends at the 
ballots is to improve the protection of the sick and of those with disabilities. Our results 
show that these expenditures are higher during election periods (SickDis in social 
protection). Despite no significant opportunism is found in unemployment protection 
(UnemPrt), our results indicate that they tend to decrease when GDP per capita rises. This 
makes sense, as unemployment decreases when the economic activity boosts. 
Apart from these findings, no other relevant results are found. Nevertheless, we 
should stress that the lack of information for some countries in some sub-components and 
the shorter time period might affect the quality of the results in comparison with the ones 
obtained for the main components. However, the results for the sub-components are, in 
general, qualitatively, quantitatively and statistically consistent with the ones for the 
respective components of public expenditures. Most importantly, they provide a rich set of 
outcomes that help us get a clearer view of where the political manipulation of expenditures 
actually happens. Undoubtedly, this analysis for the sub-components of public expenditures 
provides finer details about the way policy-makers try to maximize their chances of re-
election that otherwise might remain hidden. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
To check the robustness of our results we separate the analysis into three blocks or 
sub-groups of countries. The first sub-group is formed by Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden). These are considered to have well established 
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democracies, with a long tradition and have the reputation of being more concerned in 
keeping public accounts balanced. On the opposite side – not only geographically – we have 
the Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), which are characterized 
by more unstable and younger democracies, that traditionally exhibit more unbalanced 
public accounts and growing public debts. In the middle, we have the remaining group of 
Central European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), also with well-established democracies 
as the Nordic, but with their own specificities and with a different agenda in what concerns 
to promote balanced public accounts.
11
 The idea here is twofold: (i) infer the presence of 
political opportunism (and possible partisan effects) in each of these three sub-groups; (ii) 
and emphasize the differences between them. 
A first glance at the results reported in Table 4 reveals three interesting aspects. The 
first is that if we would focus only on the outcomes for total expenditures (column 1) we 
would conclude that no evidence of political effects is found for the Nordic and Central 
countries. In fact, majority governments seem to be more prone to environmental and 
cultural/recreational spending, and some evidence of opportunism is also found in public 
services for Nordic countries. Political opportunism is also present in this component for 
Central countries, as well as in health and social protection expenditures. In this group, 
political orientation also plays an important role in some items of government expenditure 
(public order, recreation, education and social protection). 
Nevertheless, in general, it seems that Nordic and Central countries have been 
successful in mitigating the electoral effect over total spending – probably with adjustments 
in some components at the expense of others – while Southern countries do not. 
Secondly, the opportunism in general public services is common to all three groups 
of countries, which reinforces our conclusions. Thirdly, following Brender and Drazen’s 
                                               
11 We also considered regressions with only Central European countries that took part in the Euro, to avoid any 
heterogeneity, but the results remained unchanged (those results are available upon request). Different 
partitions between EMU and non-EMU countries and before and after the introduction of the Euro are 
considered in the Annex, but once again the main conclusions of this study do not change and they are even 
reinforced (see Table A5). 
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(2005) claim, one would expect that Southern European countries, as younger democracies 
with a more pronounced history of unbalanced public accounts, might be characterized by a 
higher degree of political manipulation. However, most of the opportunistic effects inside of 
the components of public expenditures are found in the more established democracies of 
central Europe, a result that is supportive of De Haan and Klomp’s (2013) conclusion that 
the PBC is pretty much alive and is not restricted to younger democracies. Also the partisan 
effects found seem to be exclusive to this subset: left-wing governments are more prone to 
increase total spending and expenditures in public order, recreation, education and social 
protection. Nonetheless, one could argue that the near absence of political effects found in 
the Southern countries is not because governments’ do not manipulate budgetary variables 
but simply because they cannot do it efficiently. These were the countries that faced the 
hardest challenges to comply with the Maastricht criterions required to join the EMU and are 
also those that were hit more severely by the recent economic recession that came out of the 
US sub-prime mortgage crisis. As such, there is a significant amount of time where Southern 
European countries’ budgetary policy and decision making is strongly impaired, reducing the 
governments’ ability to generate fiscal electoral cycles. Finally, in what concerns to the other 
coefficients (controllers, persistence,…), the results do not change much in comparison with 
the ones presented in Table 1 for the whole sample. 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
Similarly to what we did for the sample of all countries, we also tried to check 
political effects at a deeper disaggregated level (sub-components) for each of these three 
subsets of countries. Those results are presented in Table 5. Only the estimates for the 
political variables are reported to save space, but the missing results for the controllers are 
available upon request. 
The results offer a great deal of extra information and in general confirm the findings 
reported in Table 3 for the sample of all countries. We can highlight some of the information 
that seems particularly interesting. Expenditures on executive affairs (ExcAff) remain as the 
item of public services in which a more significant rise is felt during election years, and 
  21 
continues to be common to all three sub-groups of countries. Nordic countries present 
additional but marginally significant increases in other items like R&D in environmental 
protection (EnvirRD) and street lightning (StrLight). On the contrary, our results show that 
during election periods they cut spending on other public order expenditures (OthPO), waste 
water management (WastWat) and housing development (HousDev). As we pointed out 
above, this behaviour might be the reason why political opportunism is not found at the 
aggregated level: they compensate the rise in one item by decreasing the spending in others. 
Overall, their strategy might be more of reallocating than of increasing spending.
12
 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
For Southern European countries no additional opportunism was found but Central 
European governments have a widespread opportunistic behaviour that involves rises in 
police spending (Police), pollution abatement (Pollut), community development (ComDev), 
in all health items, primary school education (Prim) and sickness and disability (SickDis) in 
years of elections. These items are almost all related to the components in which political 
opportunism was identified for this group of countries (see Table 4). 
We also did some additional sensitivity analysis to verify if our findings were 
sensitive to changes in the political variables, in the controllers and to cross effects between 
the variables (see Tables A.3 and A.4 in the Annex). Specifically, we begin by checking 
whether governments start to increase expenditures well before the elections year (see top of 
Table A.3 in the Annex). Thus, we add to the model a dummy that takes the value of one in 
the year before the elections (YrBefElect). The results indicate that governments prefer to act 
opportunistically in the elections year, and not before. As the time of the year in which the 
election takes place can be relevant for the timing of the opportunist manipulation of the 
economy, we also consider an additional pre-election variable measuring the fraction of a 
year that is within 12 months before an election (Bef12Elect). Despite this fine-tuning, our 
conclusions remain quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged. 
                                               
12 Morozumi et al. (2014) also find a similar behaviour in established democracies, where governments seem to 
reallocate expenditure and revenue components in election years, keeping their total levels unchanged. 
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To test for the presence of a full or complete opportunistic cycle, we then replace the 
election variable by a dummy that takes the value of one in the year after the elections, and 0 
otherwise (YrAftElect). Apart from defence and economic affairs, the coefficients on 
YrAftElect are all negative (in contrast to the positive ones on ElectYr), supporting the pos-
electoral predictions of opportunistic models and the results found by Castro and Martins 
(2016). However, we only find some weak significance for the coefficient on education. 
Next, instead of using dummies to control for the electoral period, we employ a 
variable that controls for the timing of the elections by measuring the proportion of time that 
has elapsed since the last election, i.e. it measures the proportion of time a government is in 
office in a particular year, since it has been elected (ElectTiming).
13
 The results remain 
consistent with the ones discussed above and with the ones reported in Table 1. 
Although with the previous changes no significant partisan or political support effects 
are found, we replaced the dummy variable LeftGov by a set of four dummies that act like a 
kind of fine-tuning for the partisan effects (see Table A.4): Partisan1 (dummy variable that 
takes de value of one when there is hegemony of right-wing and centre parties in office); 
Partisan2 (dummy variable that takes de value of one when there is dominance of right-wing 
and centre parties in office); Partisan3 (dummy variable that takes de value of one when 
there is balance of power between left and right-wing parties in office); and Partisan4 
(dummy variable that takes de value of one when there is dominance of social-democratic 
and other left parties in office).
14
 In general the partisan effects found are weak and no clear 
(or significant) trends are identified; moreover, no significant effects are observed at the 
aggregated level (total spending).
15
 
                                               
13 It is equal to 1 in the election year. 
14 The base category is Partisan5 which refers to those governments in which there is hegemony of social-
democratic and other left-wing parties. Like the LeftGov variable, those five partisan dummies were computed 
from the variable gov_party in the CPDS database. 
15 We also replaced MajGov by GovSup>50%, which corresponds to a dummy that takes value of one when the 
seat share of all parties in government is higher than 50% (in this case, weighted by the numbers of days in 
office in a given year), however, no significant effects are found. Additionally, in line with the studies by 
Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b), De Haan and Sturm (1997) and De Haan et al. (1999), we also analysed the role 
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Different controllers to our models are also tested (second block of results in Table 
A.4). Replacing LnGDPpc by the unemployment rate (Unemp) and LnPop by the percentage 
of people in total population with age lower than 15 (Young) and with 65 and over (Elderly). 
Qualitatively the main conclusions of this study are not affected with the use of these proxies 
for economic environment and demographic issues.
16
 
Some additional robustness checks are also reported in Tables A.5 and A.6 in Annex. 
Different partitions between EMU and non-EMU countries and before and after the 
introduction of the Euro are considered in the Table A.5. Regarding political opportunism, 
results for EMU countries are in line with the ones for the whole sample and more robust 
than those for the sub-set of non-EMU countries. However, opportunism is present in total 
expenditures and in the same components as for the whole sample (public services, 
education and social protection) both before and after the introduction of the Euro. Results in 
Table A.6 confirm these findings for the sample of EU countries and when we exclude the 
financial crisis period from the sample. 
Our conclusions have also proved to be highly robust to the use of a different bias-
corrected fixed effects estimator.
17
 This estimator, known as BCFE, was developed by Vos 
et al. (2015) and the authors claim that it allows for a further bias reduction for panels with a 
small time period. In our exercise it corroborates our main finding that political opportunism 
is present not only in total government expenditure, but also deep inside its components that 
are perceived to generate outcomes that are more visible to voters, in particular, public services, 
education and social protection. 
As a final exercise, we decided to test the cross-effects between the expenditures 
components. We replaced the dependent variable in the previous components-equations by 
the logarithm of the ratio of each component relatively to the others (and to total 
                                                                                                                                                 
of coalitions and fractionalisation of the government, but no additional evidence was found. Those results are 
not reported here but they are available upon request. 
16 In other regressions, we used the output gap, real GDP growth, government debt and lags of the controllers, 
but the results remained essentially the same. We also tried to test for the interaction effects between ElectYr 
and LeftGov, MajGov and LnGDPpc (or Unemp), but the respective coefficients were always statistically 
insignificant. Those results are not reported here to save space, but they are available upon request. 
17 We are grateful to one of the referees for bringing this alternative estimator to our attention. 
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expenditures). This means that now we are measuring the relative effects between the 
components when the covariates change. The results are presented in Table 6, but only for 
the coefficient on ElectYr.
18
 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
Each line in Table 6 presents the political effect for the log of the ratio of the 
respective component to each of the other components that are in each column. The results 
clearly show that expenditures in public services increase significantly in elections years 
relatively to almost all the other components of public expenditures (ranging from 2.0% to 
4.5%), and inclusive relatively to total expenditures (where the relative rise is of about 
2.5%). Overall, the results are consistent in showing public services as the component that is 
privileged by governments to generate the necessary conditions for them to obtain the 
required support to win the elections. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the presence of opportunism, partisan and political support 
effects in the functional components and sub-components of public expenditures using data 
for 18 European countries over the period 1990-2012. The empirical analysis points to a 
strong presence of political business cycles at the aggregated and disaggregated levels of 
public expenditures, contrasting with the weak and limited evidence found for the partisan 
cycles. Furthermore, some effects would remain undetected if we relied solely on traditional 
aggregated data. The amount of relevant information found by the in depth analyses of 
government expenditures is quite significant, enabling us to better understand what is 
actually being politically driven. The components of public spending identified as being 
significantly manipulated in election years are: public services, education, social protection 
and some items inside health expenditure. Those components are chosen because they, quite 
likely, aggregate items that tend to generate more visible outcomes for voters. Furthermore, 
                                               
18 Each regression was estimated with the same covariates used in our baseline model, but the estimates on their 
coefficients are not reported here to save space; however, they are available upon request. 
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it seems that the biggest categories of expenditure are especially targeted by governments 
near elections. A deeper analysis of their sub-components reveals some effects that where 
hidden in the more aggregate data analysis, which provides a clearer picture of the nature of 
the expenditures that are actually increasing in election years. We found that was the case of 
(i) expenditures on most of the health items; (ii) expenditures on primary education; (iii) 
expenditures on sickness and disability. Reinforcing the budget on these categories is seen 
across all segments of the population as a “good” policy, hence increasing governments’ 
popularity. These are highly visible polices, with quick short-term effects and very much 
consistent with political opportunism. Additionally, we found some weak evidence 
suggesting that there may be a redistribution of expenditures to signal competence, as some 
sub-components are found to decrease in electoral years. 
Our results also show that public services have proved to be the component that is 
more robust and consistent across alternative model specifications. The only sub-category 
found to be always targeted in election years is expenditures on executive and legislative 
organs, financial and fiscal affairs and external affairs. The management costs of public 
funds and public debt included inside this sub-category might be a relevant source for the 
cycle found at this level. Hence, this study contributes to the understanding of the hidden 
complexity of political business cycles buried inside the main aggregates of public 
expenditures and our results highlight the need to continue the development of theoretical 
budget cycles models that take in consideration not only the growth of public expenditures 
but also where they are allocated and the purpose for which they are used. 
We also conclude that political opportunism in Central European countries ranges 
over several components, while in Nordic and Southern European countries it is 
concentrated in public services. But Nordic (and Central) countries seem to have been able 
to mitigate this evidence in total expenditures by making surgical negative adjustments in 
other components. 
Finally, we also verify that a better economic environment exerts a positive impact 
on almost all components, while relative prices have proved not to be relevant. On the 
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contrary, demographic effects seem to be dependent on the specificities of each component, 
having a negative impact on those components that benefit from economies of scale. 
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Table 1. Political opportunism and partisan effects in the components of public expenditures 
Dep. Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Log of (per capita) TotExpd PubServ Defence PubOrder EconAff Environm Housing Health Recreat Educ SocProtect 
            
ElectYr 0.012** 0.036*** 0.004 0.005 -0.011 -0.001 0.003 0.013 0.011 0.012** 0.016*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.016) (0.017) (0.025) (0.016) (0.032) (0.011) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) 
LeftGov 0.001 -0.001 -0.008 -0.033 -0.008 0.033* 0.058 0.006 0.012 0.017* 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.020) (0.037) (0.018) (0.036) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) 
MajGov 0.008 0.020 -0.001 -0.016 0.012 0.012 0.003 0.007 0.002 -0.004 0.014 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.028) (0.058) (0.019) (0.021) (0.013) (0.011) 
LnGDPpc 0.141*** 0.001 0.204* 0.669*** 0.121 0.437*** 0.421* 0.455*** 0.443*** 0.193*** 0.023 
 (0.046) (0.051) (0.123) (0.137) (0.182) (0.123) (0.248) (0.091) (0.093) (0.051) (0.044) 
LnRelPr -0.001 0.025 0.069 -0.019 0.229 -0.148 -0.207 -0.059 -0.208 0.009 0.033 
 (0.085) (0.093) (0.228) (0.216) (0.332) (0.204) (0.434) (0.137) (0.151) (0.091) (0.074) 
LnPop -0.251** 0.143 -0.574* 0.261 0.622 -0.654** -0.251 -0.263 -0.521** -0.548*** -0.041 
 (0.126) (0.121) (0.294) (0.305) (0.552) (0.279) (0.593) (0.194) (0.216) (0.134) (0.109) 
DepVar(-1) 0.933*** 0.943*** 0.829*** 0.361*** 0.528*** 0.796*** 0.490*** 0.720*** 0.793*** 0.951*** 0.948*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.041) (0.034) (0.050) (0.036) (0.049) (0.031) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025) 
            
            
No. Observations 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 
No. Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
            
Notes: See Tables A.1 and A.2 in Annex. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the 
null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The logarithm of the real value of each expenditure component 
per capita is used as dependent variable in each equation. A bias-corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDVC) 
estimator for dynamic panel data models is employed. The Blundell and Bond (1998) procedure is used as the initial 
estimator. We undertake 50 repetitions of the procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard errors. The results do not 
qualitatively change with more repetitions (100, 200 or 500) or when the Arellano and Bond (1991) or Anderson and 
Hsiao (1982) estimator are chosen as initial estimators. Country and time effects are controlled for in all estimations. 
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Table 2. Sub-components analysis (part I) 
 1. Public Services 2. Defence 3. Public Order 
Dep.Vars.: (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) 
Log of (p.c.) ExecAff ForAid GServ BasicRD GServRD OthServ DebtTrs MilDef CivDef FMilAid DefRD OthDef Police Fire Courts Prisions OthPO 
ElectYr 0.030** 0.030 0.026 -0.016 0.004 0.059 0.013 -0.007 -0.055 0.019 -0.089 0.099 0.023** 0.013 0.009 0.001 -0.060 
 (0.015) (0.048) (0.028) (0.135) (0.055) (0.065) (0.019) (0.018) (0.085) (0.052) (0.078) (0.115) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.045) 
LeftGov 0.004 0.049 0.022 0.109 0.140* 0.114 -0.011 0.021 -0.024 -0.058 -0.077 0.103 0.014 0.004 -0.010 0.010 -0.005 
 (0.021) (0.051) (0.036) (0.190) (0.077) (0.091) (0.023) (0.024) (0.089) (0.079) (0.112) (0.154) (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.075) 
MajGov 0.007 -0.076 -0.095** 0.115 0.095 -0.049 0.013 -0.039 0.033 0.031 0.053 -0.154 -0.005 -0.038 -0.015 -0.026 0.062 
 (0.028) (0.067) (0.048) (0.196) (0.077) (0.115) (0.031) (0.031) (0.160) (0.104) (0.142) (0.190) (0.017) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028) (0.091) 
LnGDPpc 0.380** 1.214*** 0.718*** 1.166 0.184 0.818 0.000 0.233 0.341 0.592 -1.124 1.022 0.279*** 0.303** 0.397*** 0.239 0.207 
 (0.153) (0.342) (0.254) (1.325) (0.504) (0.750) (0.159) (0.155) (0.867) (0.503) (0.822) (1.154) (0.090) (0.129) (0.122) (0.148) (0.438) 
LnRelPr -0.263 0.450 -0.650* -0.548 0.676 -0.480 0.223 -0.178 0.870 -0.826 0.395 -2.059 -0.241* -0.195 -0.365* -0.477** 0.190 
 (0.226) (0.555) (0.371) (1.721) (0.832) (1.307) (0.240) (0.248) (1.522) (0.874) (1.224) (2.118) (0.134) (0.198) (0.190) (0.223) (0.720) 
LnPop 0.284 0.862 -0.031 2.007 -1.470* 1.915 0.866*** 0.220 -1.874 1.019 2.146 0.471 0.004 0.384* 0.544*** 0.531** -0.395 
 (0.237) (0.796) (0.349) (2.736) (0.788) (1.312) (0.264) (0.235) (2.625) (0.785) (1.440) (2.857) (0.227) (0.208) (0.207) (0.253) (0.794) 
DepVar(-1) 0.706*** 0.580*** 0.779*** 0.345*** 0.963*** 0.637*** 1.019*** 0.822*** 0.537*** 0.797*** 0.715*** 0.687*** 0.907*** 0.821*** 0.783*** 0.805*** 0.846*** 
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.074) (0.045) (0.068) (0.034) (0.051) (0.071) (0.046) (0.054) (0.057) (0.052) (0.036) (0.037) (0.049) (0.055) 
                  
No. Observ. 228 222 228 201 197 213 228 228 152 198 183 178 228 228 228 228 222 
No.Countries 17 16 17 15 15 15 17 17 13 15 14 13 17 17 17 17 17 
                  
                  
 4. Economic Affairs 5. Environmental Protection   
Dep.Vars.: (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6) (4.7) (4.8) (4.9) (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6)   
Log of (p.c.) GenAff Agric Energy Constr Transp Communic OthInd EAffRD OthEAff Waste WastWater Pollut Protect EnvirRD OthEnvir   
ElectYr -0.014 0.058* -0.060 0.006 0.016 -0.026 -0.003 -0.029 -0.024 -0.008 -0.110* 0.115 -0.067* 0.016 -0.010   
 (0.067) (0.032) (0.096) (0.071) (0.032) (0.130) (0.033) (0.032) (0.085) (0.040) (0.058) (0.123) (0.038) (0.092) (0.035)   
LeftGov 0.012 0.004 0.203* 0.174* 0.087** -0.219 -0.023 0.022 0.148 0.048 -0.085 0.087 0.093* 0.048 0.086**   
 (0.086) (0.040) (0.107) (0.099) (0.039) (0.160) (0.050) (0.036) (0.109) (0.051) (0.085) (0.152) (0.050) (0.101) (0.037)   
MajGov 0.055 -0.037 -0.031 -0.060 -0.016 -0.131 -0.077 -0.035 0.098 0.049 -0.009 -0.112 -0.008 -0.025 0.039   
 (0.112) (0.052) (0.140) (0.106) (0.051) (0.210) (0.056) (0.046) (0.144) (0.068) (0.104) (0.192) (0.057) (0.127) (0.049)   
LnGDPpc -1.263** 0.371 -0.142 0.322 1.094*** 2.816** 0.794** 0.436* 1.079 0.527 0.904* 0.206 0.842** 1.259* -0.149   
 (0.606) (0.280) (0.703) (0.561) (0.289) (1.151) (0.343) (0.252) (0.811) (0.339) (0.504) (1.136) (0.338) (0.730) (0.242)   
LnRelPr 1.573* -0.316 2.743** 0.853 1.010** -3.836** -1.418*** -0.430 0.168 0.315 -0.672 -0.094 0.326 -0.101 0.531   
 (0.900) (0.422) (1.172) (1.160) (0.417) (1.682) (0.549) (0.382) (1.186) (0.525) (1.180) (1.527) (0.477) (1.005) (0.418)   
LnPop 4.055*** 0.087 0.680 -1.493 0.514 1.945 0.232 0.147 -1.428 0.321 -0.371 2.414 0.052 1.608 0.705   
 (0.996) (0.387) (1.717) (1.339) (0.414) (1.578) (0.739) (0.612) (1.154) (0.521) (1.220) (2.126) (0.625) (1.372) (0.561)   
DepVar(-1) 0.590*** 0.563*** 0.620*** 0.710*** 0.430*** 0.314*** 0.828*** 0.913*** 0.720*** 0.776*** 0.834*** 0.504*** 0.675*** 0.554*** 0.647***   
 (0.072) (0.057) (0.048) (0.044) (0.065) (0.062) (0.052) (0.059) (0.056) (0.040) (0.047) (0.079) (0.052) (0.070) (0.050)   
                  
No. Observ. 228 228 222 221 228 228 221 222 228 228 213 215 221 213 222   
No.Countries 17 17 16 16 17 17 17 16 17 17 16 16 16 16 16   
                  
Notes: See Tables 1 and Table A.1 in Annex. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. Data for TransfGen, (in Public 
Services) and PubOrdRD (in Public Order) are missing for most countries; the lack of variability makes it impossible to run the model in those cases. Country and time effects are controlled for in all estimations. 
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Table 3. Sub-components analysis (part II) 
 6. Housing Amenities 7. Health 8. Recreation 
Dep.Vars.: (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6) (7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6) (8.1) (8.2) (8.3) (8.4) (8.5) (8.6) 
Log of (p.c.) HousDev ComDev WatSup StrLight HousRD OthHous MedProd OutPServ HospServ PubHlth HlthRD OthHlth Sports Culture Broadcast Religious RecrRD OthRecr 
                   
ElectYr 0.001 0.008 0.063 0.008 0.058 0.154 0.066* 0.046 0.022*** 0.045 0.061** -0.010 0.013 0.012 0.000 0.028 0.010 -0.093 
 (0.106) (0.092) (0.059) (0.040) (0.097) (0.106) (0.036) (0.029) (0.008) (0.030) (0.025) (0.046) (0.016) (0.019) (0.077) (0.046) (0.060) (0.074) 
LeftGov 0.102 -0.202 0.114 0.105* -0.182 0.085 0.030 0.047 0.006 -0.048 0.065** -0.024 0.024 0.050** -0.059 -0.017 0.095 -0.012 
 (0.126) (0.125) (0.092) (0.063) (0.146) (0.171) (0.051) (0.041) (0.014) (0.035) (0.031) (0.059) (0.020) (0.024) (0.099) (0.042) (0.083) (0.097) 
MajGov -0.064 -0.306** -0.046 0.129* 0.088 0.342* -0.023 -0.013 -0.015 -0.001 -0.009 -0.068 -0.044 -0.036 0.074 -0.082 0.021 -0.166 
 (0.128) (0.133) (0.075) (0.066) (0.121) (0.181) (0.054) (0.043) (0.013) (0.044) (0.041) (0.077) (0.027) (0.031) (0.129) (0.068) (0.110) (0.116) 
LnGDPpc 1.296 0.296 0.656 -0.286 0.479 0.181 0.578* 0.646*** 0.247*** 0.003 0.406* 0.306 0.581*** 0.542*** 0.059 0.555 0.348 0.905 
 (0.852) (0.746) (0.450) (0.409) (0.859) (0.963) (0.298) (0.230) (0.075) (0.215) (0.221) (0.427) (0.133) (0.166) (0.651) (0.351) (0.646) (0.592) 
LnRelPr 1.916 0.727 0.421 1.939** -3.339*** 1.130 -0.158 0.484 -0.287** 0.054 -0.724** -0.157 -0.769*** -0.369 -0.692 -0.611 -0.904 -1.341 
 (1.246) (1.295) (0.790) (0.961) (1.265) (1.531) (0.637) (0.483) (0.137) (0.363) (0.330) (0.652) (0.218) (0.252) (1.046) (0.560) (1.328) (0.909) 
LnPop -0.141 -1.116 -0.669 0.449 2.181 0.161 -0.141 -0.246 -0.116 0.256 -0.408 1.250* -0.541** 0.120 1.486 0.061 0.537 -1.254 
 (1.829) (1.503) (0.862) (1.266) (1.953) (2.052) (0.673) (0.543) (0.196) (0.506) (0.444) (0.700) (0.236) (0.274) (1.043) (0.588) (1.196) (1.140) 
DepVar(-1) 0.337*** 0.936*** 0.740*** 0.865*** 0.723*** 0.809*** 0.812*** 0.819*** 0.971*** 0.891*** 0.945*** 0.800*** 0.932*** 0.807*** 0.911*** 0.756*** 0.641*** 0.883*** 
 (0.063) (0.041) (0.062) (0.071) (0.059) (0.052) (0.037) (0.039) (0.029) (0.035) (0.047) (0.060) (0.037) (0.047) (0.050) (0.040) (0.053) (0.049) 
                   
                   
No. Observ. 226 202 211 144 144 165 221 221 211 222 228 228 228 228 228 224 185 191 
No.Countries 17 15 16 11 11 13 16 16 16 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 14 14 
                   
                   
 9. Education 10. Social Protection  
Dep.Vars.: (9.1) (9.2) (9.3) (9.4) (9.5) (9.6) (9.7) (9.8) (10.1) (10.2) (10.3) (10.4) (10.5) (10.6) (10.7) (10.8) (10.9)  
Log of (p.c.) Prim Second PosSec Tert Genr SubServ EducRD OthEduc SickDis Olders Survivors Family UnemPrt HousPrt SocExcl SocPrtRD OthSocP  
                   
ElectYr 0.016** 0.004 0.095 0.011 0.001 0.024 0.007 -0.009 0.020** 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.042 -0.035 0.082 0.010  
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.110) (0.017) (0.032) (0.031) (0.061) (0.028) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.023) (0.081) (0.038) (0.090) (0.025)  
LeftGov 0.023** 0.038*** -0.002 0.012 0.112** 0.040 -0.050 0.037 0.013 -0.005 0.031* 0.029 0.032 0.082 0.058 0.170 0.032  
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.149) (0.019) (0.046) (0.036) (0.081) (0.035) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.029) (0.166) (0.049) (0.146) (0.030)  
MajGov -0.010 -0.008 0.098 -0.063** 0.043 0.039 -0.130 0.006 -0.024 0.007 0.022 -0.003 -0.003 -0.031 -0.043 -0.149 0.038  
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.193) (0.025) (0.042) (0.045) (0.096) (0.048) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.038) (0.140) (0.066) (0.144) (0.042)  
LnGDPpc 0.212*** 0.299*** 1.916** 0.308** 0.054 0.469** 0.952* 0.125 0.224*** 0.038 0.099 0.629*** -0.671*** 0.547 0.354 -0.389 0.159  
 (0.063) (0.074) (0.864) (0.125) (0.242) (0.226) (0.492) (0.258) (0.081) (0.085) (0.113) (0.113) (0.194) (0.885) (0.335) (0.925) (0.198)  
LnRelPr -0.092 0.066 -1.384 -0.174 -0.344 0.256 -1.778** -0.255 -0.206 0.016 -0.006 -0.022 0.752** 0.462 0.532 -1.375 -0.359  
 (0.110) (0.122) (1.351) (0.202) (0.446) (0.361) (0.717) (0.395) (0.136) (0.137) (0.169) (0.185) (0.298) (1.343) (0.525) (1.898) (0.326)  
LnPop -0.295* 0.065 -0.735 -0.401* 1.207** 0.187 -0.087 -0.027 0.080 0.665*** -0.092 -0.385 1.886*** 1.271 0.712 6.790** -0.267  
 (0.156) (0.143) (1.684) (0.221) (0.564) (0.618) (1.211) (0.424) (0.204) (0.170) (0.168) (0.253) (0.332) (1.837) (0.495) (2.849) (0.313)  
DepVar(-1) 0.966*** 0.800*** 0.631*** 1.051*** 0.595*** 0.840*** 0.925*** 0.896*** 0.944*** 0.865*** 0.980*** 0.914*** 0.822*** 0.656*** 0.718*** 0.771*** 0.970***  
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.062) (0.028) (0.047) (0.044) (0.047) (0.051) (0.041) (0.038) (0.026) (0.035) (0.048) (0.063) (0.054) (0.063) (0.033)  
                   
                   
No. Observ. 228 228 160 228 215 222 221 228 228 228 228 228 228 211 228 184 228  
No.Countries 17 17 12 17 15 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 16 17 15 17  
                   
Notes: See Tables 1 and 2 and Table A.1 in Annex. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. DepVar(-1) represents the 
first lag of the respective dependent variable. Country and time effects are controlled for in all estimations. 
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Table 4. Robustness check I: Nordic, Central and Southern European countries 
Log of 
(p.c.) 
TotExpd PubServ Defence PubOrder EconAff Environm Housing Health Recreat Educ SocProtect 
Nordic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectYr 0.002 0.036** -0.018 0.024 -0.020 -0.021 -0.062 0.011 0.021 0.006 0.018 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.036) (0.019) (0.042) (0.031) (0.076) (0.019) (0.025) (0.018) (0.017) 
LeftGov -0.013 0.022 -0.045 -0.011 -0.084 0.027 0.031 0.002 -0.001 0.007 0.004 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.050) (0.027) (0.058) (0.040) (0.099) (0.025) (0.036) (0.026) (0.022) 
MajGov 0.023 0.033 0.042 0.026 0.051 0.113** 0.133 0.013 0.076* 0.016 0.033 
 (0.027) (0.031) (0.071) (0.033) (0.069) (0.051) (0.119) (0.032) (0.046) (0.032) (0.030) 
LnGDPpc 0.162* 0.109 0.496** 0.291** 0.243 0.376* -0.636 0.298*** 0.360** 0.283** 0.028 
 (0.093) (0.131) (0.245) (0.117) (0.323) (0.222) (0.556) (0.107) (0.166) (0.111) (0.102) 
LnRelPr -0.098 -0.201 -0.535 -0.115 -0.310 -0.112 -0.421 -0.112 -0.070 -0.145 0.053 
 (0.156) (0.193) (0.442) (0.208) (0.445) (0.295) (0.767) (0.186) (0.274) (0.200) (0.167) 
LnPop -0.671* -0.005 -1.990** -0.940* -0.736 -1.901*** 1.425 -1.122** -1.360* -1.089** -0.563 
 (0.395) (0.480) (0.943) (0.508) (1.135) (0.720) (1.905) (0.466) (0.769) (0.484) (0.432) 
DepVar(-1) 0.992*** 0.872*** 0.982*** 0.948*** 0.647*** 0.853*** 0.279** 1.001*** 0.933*** 0.959*** 1.005*** 
 (0.057) (0.096) (0.083) (0.060) (0.106) (0.059) (0.115) (0.045) (0.077) (0.060) (0.061) 
            
            
No. Observ. 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
No.Countr. 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
            
            
Central (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectYr 0.011 0.024** -0.007 0.015 -0.017 0.009 0.045 0.025** 0.001 0.014 0.017* 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) (0.010) (0.036) (0.029) (0.050) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) 
LeftGov 0.032** -0.014 0.025 0.028** -0.004 0.020 0.066 0.017 0.035* 0.025** 0.026** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.034) (0.014) (0.077) (0.044) (0.073) (0.014) (0.020) (0.012) (0.013) 
MajGov 0.007 0.032* -0.019 0.002 0.027 -0.013 0.004 -0.007 0.020 -0.001 0.018 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.035) (0.017) (0.069) (0.047) (0.076) (0.017) (0.023) (0.014) (0.015) 
LnGDPpc 0.184*** -0.030 0.057 0.103* 0.243 0.520*** 0.933*** 0.131* 0.267*** 0.093* 0.053 
 (0.071) (0.064) (0.127) (0.062) (0.270) (0.193) (0.275) (0.070) (0.100) (0.054) (0.055) 
LnRelPr 0.225 0.064 -0.151 -0.324** 2.218*** 0.119 0.157 -0.082 -0.042 -0.193 0.126 
 (0.164) (0.156) (0.299) (0.130) (0.726) (0.419) (0.609) (0.148) (0.204) (0.121) (0.123) 
LnPop 0.218 0.100 0.018 -0.120 -0.224 -0.695 -0.802 -0.335** -0.530*** -0.212* 0.503*** 
 (0.172) (0.166) (0.317) (0.128) (0.708) (0.423) (0.683) (0.160) (0.199) (0.116) (0.158) 
DepVar(-1) 0.672*** 0.965*** 0.895*** 0.983*** 0.290*** 0.789*** 0.416*** 0.961*** 0.902*** 0.991*** 0.718*** 
 (0.070) (0.048) (0.057) (0.035) (0.087) (0.051) (0.058) (0.043) (0.052) (0.043) (0.066) 
            
            
No. Observ. 166 166 166 166 164 166 166 166 166 166 166 
No. Countr. 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
            
            
South (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectYr 0.021* 0.052*** 0.030 -0.021 0.026 0.013 0.028 0.005 0.036 0.017 0.009 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.051) (0.050) (0.046) (0.036) (0.081) (0.034) (0.039) (0.020) (0.011) 
LeftGov 0.003 -0.012 0.009 -0.152** 0.006 0.078* 0.036 0.031 -0.022 0.014 0.002 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.058) (0.059) (0.055) (0.041) (0.099) (0.039) (0.047) (0.023) (0.013) 
MajGov 0.000 -0.002 -0.011 -0.057 0.013 -0.012 -0.073 0.024 -0.086** -0.025 0.009 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.053) (0.048) (0.046) (0.035) (0.085) (0.033) (0.040) (0.020) (0.011) 
LnGDPpc 0.249* 0.151 0.009 0.634 0.158 1.161*** 0.486 0.796** 1.171*** 0.463** 0.170 
 (0.136) (0.180) (0.517) (0.488) (0.481) (0.382) (0.904) (0.350) (0.426) (0.213) (0.111) 
LnRelPr 0.117 0.281 1.478** 1.237* -0.598 0.316 -0.582 1.326*** -0.081 0.471* 0.089 
 (0.170) (0.228) (0.611) (0.652) (0.612) (0.469) (1.114) (0.467) (0.582) (0.261) (0.142) 
LnPop 0.158 0.196 0.014 1.579 0.840 -0.132 -2.416 1.377* -0.711 -0.402 0.297 
 (0.275) (0.338) (1.006) (1.015) (1.004) (0.760) (1.860) (0.731) (0.874) (0.414) (0.222) 
DepVar(-1) 0.734*** 1.012*** 0.467*** 0.171*** 0.342*** 0.241*** 0.422*** 0.185*** 0.506*** 0.681*** 0.845*** 
 (0.067) (0.065) (0.110) (0.042) (0.083) (0.082) (0.107) (0.070) (0.081) (0.066) (0.041) 
            
            
No. Observ. 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
No. Countr. 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
            
Notes: See Table 1. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden; Central 
countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom; 
Southern countries: Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Country and time effects are controlled for in all estimations. 
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Table 5. Robustness check II: Sub-components analysis by group of countries 
  1. Public Services 2. Defence 3. Public Order 
 Log p.c. ExecAff ForAid GServ BasicRD GServRD OthServ DebtTrs MilDef CivDef FMilAid DefRD Police Fire Courts Prisions OthPO 
N
or
d
ic
 
ElectYr 0.034* -0.002 0.007 0.035 0.030 0.032 -0.013 0.003 -0.195 -0.051 -0.350 -0.005 0.017 0.009 0.022 -0.245** 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.030) (0.026) (0.052) (0.132) (0.049) (0.025) (0.148) (0.112) (0.280) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.103) 
LeftGov 0.024 0.044 0.012 -0.017 0.189** 0.308 0.133* 0.061 0.100 -0.174 -0.355 -0.001 0.013 -0.033 -0.013 0.155 
 (0.058) (0.038) (0.050) (0.039) (0.093) (0.214) (0.080) (0.042) (0.236) (0.190) (0.345) (0.033) (0.031) (0.038) (0.036) (0.183) 
MajGov -0.082 -0.071 -0.059 0.001 -0.298 -0.018 0.062 -0.074 0.043 0.227 0.575 -0.037 -0.044 -0.063 0.005 -0.112 
 (0.072) (0.048) (0.065) (0.049) (0.220) (0.277) (0.103) (0.052) (0.287) (0.232) (0.424) (0.039) (0.041) (0.046) (0.043) (0.225) 
                  
C
en
tr
al
 
ElectYr 0.015** 0.028 0.036 -0.013 0.000 0.038 0.012 -0.025 0.082 0.009 0.011 0.032** 0.010 0.005 0.015 -0.028 
 (0.007) (0.032) (0.042) (0.061) (0.070) (0.111) (0.023) (0.024) (0.096) (0.049) (0.061) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.054) 
LeftGov 0.014 -0.065 0.034 0.290** 0.156 -0.062 -0.036 -0.007 0.014 -0.015 -0.193 0.017 0.020 -0.000 0.040 0.016 
 (0.032) (0.061) (0.075) (0.125) (0.129) (0.215) (0.045) (0.048) (0.138) (0.083) (0.137) (0.024) (0.023) (0.019) (0.032) (0.096) 
MajGov 0.007 0.037 -0.190** 0.022 0.154 0.015 0.042 -0.027 -0.257 0.012 -0.062 0.004 -0.009 -0.010 -0.013 -0.125 
 (0.036) (0.066) (0.088) (0.125) (0.171) (0.176) (0.050) (0.054) (0.331) (0.109) (0.149) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.038) (0.112) 
                  
S
ou
th
 
ElectYr 0.030** 0.053 0.023 -0.070 -0.016 0.102 0.002 -0.011 0.127 0.168 -0.031 0.002 0.027 -0.002 -0.037 0.026 
 (0.015) (0.127) (0.054) (0.513) (0.098) (0.191) (0.034) (0.040) (0.188) (0.205) (0.142) (0.022) (0.047) (0.046) (0.050) (0.135) 
LeftGov -0.041 0.338 0.081 -0.156 0.039 0.364 0.020 -0.037 -0.105 0.169 0.349 -0.011 -0.017 -0.093 -0.111 -0.062 
 (0.072) (0.252) (0.077) (1.159) (0.151) (0.403) (0.054) (0.063) (0.282) (0.401) (0.278) (0.035) (0.073) (0.067) (0.082) (0.279) 
MajGov -0.045 -0.220 -0.012 -0.032 0.014 -0.034 0.023 -0.176*** 0.186 0.116 0.199 -0.034 -0.049 -0.052 -0.076 0.123 
 (0.077) (0.246) (0.076) (0.987) (0.146) (0.379) (0.053) (0.063) (0.451) (0.351) (0.283) (0.035) (0.080) (0.081) (0.082) (0.326) 
  4. Economic Affairs 5. Environmental Protection  
 Log p.c. GenAff Agric Energy Constr Transp Communic OthInd EAffRD OthEAff Waste WastWater Pollut Protect EnvirRD OthEnvir  
N
o
rd
ic
 
ElectYr 0.012 -0.040 0.102 -0.157 -0.012 -0.030 0.115 -0.076 -0.129 -0.037 -0.361* -0.039 -0.017 0.198** -0.001  
 (0.031) (0.040) (0.123) (0.126) (0.023) (0.194) (0.117) (0.084) (0.188) (0.075) (0.206) (0.122) (0.055) (0.100) (0.039)  
LeftGov -0.024 -0.023 0.241 0.394* 0.032 -0.374 -0.127 0.010 0.336 -0.015 -0.437 0.251 0.123 0.044 0.049  
 (0.051) (0.065) (0.200) (0.206) (0.039) (0.281) (0.132) (0.138) (0.312) (0.135) (0.348) (0.197) (0.087) (0.173) (0.061)  
MajGov -0.034 -0.070 0.026 0.220 -0.010 0.185 -0.144 -0.026 0.707* -0.072 -0.252 0.021 -0.015 0.194 -0.169**  
 (0.062) (0.078) (0.270) (0.248) (0.047) (0.374) (0.173) (0.175) (0.396) (0.169) (0.335) (0.264) (0.112) (0.209) (0.079)  
                  
C
en
tr
a
l 
ElectYr -0.065 0.048 -0.011 0.070 0.014 -0.033 -0.014 -0.011 0.063 0.040 -0.055 0.136** -0.089** 0.011 -0.006  
 (0.100) (0.033) (0.108) (0.113) (0.042) (0.161) (0.033) (0.030) (0.118) (0.056) (0.079) (0.060) (0.044) (0.046) (0.040)  
LeftGov 0.105 0.024 0.046 0.057 0.087 -0.145 -0.007 -0.008 0.123 0.019 0.168* 0.041 0.018 0.018 0.102  
 (0.187) (0.062) (0.197) (0.199) (0.076) (0.289) (0.064) (0.058) (0.232) (0.099) (0.102) (0.116) (0.098) (0.116) (0.070)  
MajGov 0.081 0.011 -0.154 -0.084 0.038 0.063 -0.032 0.025 0.054 0.285** 0.151 -0.150 0.010 0.048 0.040  
 (0.206) (0.069) (0.230) (0.205) (0.085) (0.328) (0.072) (0.062) (0.252) (0.122) (0.146) (0.132) (0.084) (0.095) (0.079)  
                  
S
o
u
th
 
ElectYr 0.164 0.146 -0.284 -0.001 0.037 -0.171 -0.108 0.028 -0.117 -0.106** 0.002 0.156 -0.068 -0.089 -0.056  
 (0.125) (0.091) (0.177) (0.107) (0.052) (0.272) (0.098) (0.046) (0.088) (0.054) (0.062) (0.524) (0.052) (0.253) (0.063)  
LeftGov -0.049 -0.149 0.672* 0.052 0.007 -1.085** -0.111 -0.013 -0.089 0.018 -0.069 -0.081 0.141 0.333 -0.062  
 (0.185) (0.135) (0.349) (0.164) (0.083) (0.439) (0.157) (0.096) (0.134) (0.087) (0.101) (1.190) (0.106) (0.514) (0.132)  
MajGov 0.201 -0.301** 0.515 -0.250 -0.217** -0.926** -0.273* -0.108 -0.177 -0.085 -0.104 -0.622 -0.073 -0.201 0.111  
 (0.190) (0.142) (0.354) (0.173) (0.085) (0.461) (0.160) (0.092) (0.145) (0.090) (0.111) (0.940) (0.099) (0.450) (0.122)  
  6. Housing Amenities 7. Health 8. Recreation 
 Log p.c. HousDev ComDev WatSup StrLight HousRD OthHous MedProd OutPServ HospServ PubHlth HlthRD Sports Culture Broadcast Religious RecrRD 
N
o
rd
ic
 
ElectYr -0.309* 0.180 -0.001 0.415* -0.244  0.002 0.005 -0.012 -0.008 0.038 0.025 -0.003 0.313 0.019 0.025 
 (0.165) (0.514) (0.042) (0.222) (0.228)  (0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.027) (0.038) (0.017) (0.024) (0.231) (0.054) (0.174) 
LeftGov 0.278 -1.178* -0.014 -0.614* 0.087  -0.027 -0.021 0.006 -0.017 0.079 0.030 0.056 -0.173 -0.003 -0.018 
 (0.251) (0.668) (0.085) (0.344) (0.317)  (0.028) (0.031) (0.023) (0.047) (0.061) (0.027) (0.040) (0.364) (0.085) (0.285) 
MajGov 0.132 -0.527 -0.105 0.063 dropped  -0.053 -0.067* -0.052* 0.013 0.007 0.044 0.004 -0.134 0.054 0.178 
 (0.315) (0.777) (0.069) (0.387)   (0.034) (0.040) (0.029) (0.058) (0.078) (0.032) (0.054) (0.453) (0.107) (0.358) 
                  
C
en
tr
a
l 
ElectYr 0.096 0.064* 0.075 -0.025 0.003 0.156* 0.130** 0.098** 0.032*** 0.064* 0.087** 0.005 0.017 -0.087 0.015 -0.012 
 (0.138) (0.033) (0.077) (0.034) (0.126) (0.091) (0.063) (0.048) (0.011) (0.036) (0.038) (0.020) (0.022) (0.089) (0.057) (0.065) 
LeftGov 0.092 0.079 0.077 0.069 -0.155 0.257* 0.116 0.033 0.001 -0.056 0.055 -0.006 0.028 -0.019 -0.155** -0.040 
 (0.241) (0.062) (0.140) (0.067) (0.222) (0.153) (0.121) (0.097) (0.018) (0.072) (0.077) (0.036) (0.043) (0.163) (0.071) (0.099) 
MajGov -0.128 -0.072 0.024 0.100 0.218 0.132 0.036 -0.003 0.004 -0.036 -0.042 -0.039 -0.041 0.244 -0.093 -0.060 
 (0.266) (0.070) (0.159) (0.072) (0.233) (0.202) (0.120) (0.093) (0.022) (0.076) (0.082) (0.047) (0.047) (0.199) (0.107) (0.180) 
                  
S
o
u
th
 
ElectYr 0.101 -0.257 0.102 0.046 -0.156 0.288 -0.020 -0.038 0.008 0.023 0.014 0.027 0.042 -0.007 0.051 0.048 
 (0.133) (0.169) (0.089) (0.091) (0.302) (0.204) (0.045) (0.043) (0.028) (0.062) (0.032) (0.035) (0.052) (0.086) (0.088) (0.100) 
LeftGov -0.192 -0.024 0.181 0.247* 1.444 -0.235 -0.095 0.121* -0.008 -0.215* 0.051 0.037 0.024 -0.020 -0.087 0.061 
 (0.182) (0.329) (0.129) (0.143) (0.988) (0.336) (0.063) (0.062) (0.035) (0.127) (0.048) (0.057) (0.083) (0.144) (0.143) (0.212) 
MajGov -0.217 -0.431 -0.031 0.220 0.724 0.339 -0.194** 0.046 0.009 -0.131 0.001 -0.137** -0.125 -0.186 -0.274* -0.050 
 (0.228) (0.309) (0.141) (0.154) (0.678) (0.341) (0.079) (0.070) (0.051) (0.118) (0.050) (0.057) (0.084) (0.145) (0.149) (0.201) 
  9. Education 10. Social Protection 
 Log p.c. Prim Second PosSec Tert Genr SubServ EducRD SickDis Olders Survivors Family UnemPrt HousPrt SocExcl SocPrtRD OthSocP 
N
o
rd
ic
 
ElectYr 0.009 -0.004 0.498 -0.020 -0.019 0.006 0.051 0.018 0.001 -0.007 -0.006 0.045 0.008 -0.009 0.110 0.027 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.357) (0.020) (0.048) (0.088) (0.156) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.054) (0.075) (0.031) (0.124) (0.055) 
LeftGov 0.000 0.020 0.220 0.005 -0.018 -0.024 -0.083 0.024 0.006 0.005 0.025 -0.042 0.117 0.015 0.095 0.103 
 (0.022) (0.032) (0.586) (0.033) (0.076) (0.153) (0.173) (0.038) (0.027) (0.026) (0.023) (0.083) (0.120) (0.052) (0.199) (0.091) 
MajGov -0.042 -0.011 0.176 -0.079* -0.038 -0.110 -0.002 -0.101** -0.028 -0.043 -0.024 -0.174 -0.155 -0.020 -0.215 0.012 
 (0.027) (0.040) (0.527) (0.042) (0.092) (0.192) (0.280) (0.049) (0.034) (0.031) (0.030) (0.109) (0.146) (0.065) (0.265) (0.116) 
                  
C
en
tr
a
l 
ElectYr 0.021** 0.005 -0.005 0.020 0.028 0.036 -0.014 0.016** 0.008 0.009 0.021 0.005 -0.082 -0.004 0.108 -0.039 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.038) (0.025) (0.045) (0.028) (0.073) (0.008) (0.016) (0.019) (0.014) (0.026) (0.081) (0.023) (0.108) (0.026) 
LeftGov 0.019 0.008 -0.005 0.028 0.083 0.068 -0.046 -0.016 0.010 0.087** 0.014 0.065 -0.065 0.024 -0.023 -0.052 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.085) (0.048) (0.070) (0.057) (0.142) (0.021) (0.029) (0.037) (0.026) (0.047) (0.166) (0.043) (0.208) (0.049) 
MajGov 0.020 -0.010 -0.079 -0.109** 0.190*** 0.055 -0.281* 0.021 -0.027 0.015 0.031 0.010 0.107 -0.030 0.121 0.121** 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.117) (0.053) (0.072) (0.062) (0.164) (0.027) (0.033) (0.045) (0.030) (0.054) (0.157) (0.049) (0.186) (0.056) 
                  
S
o
u
th
 
ElectYr 0.010 0.001 0.109 0.025 0.020 0.006 -0.011 0.027 -0.003 0.016 -0.025 -0.037 0.115 -0.121 0.209 0.027 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.303) (0.022) (0.068) (0.035) (0.092) (0.019) (0.011) (0.023) (0.044) (0.053) (0.236) (0.132) (0.345) (0.061) 
LeftGov 0.013 0.046 0.088 0.025 -0.124 0.160** 0.046 0.016 -0.012 -0.017 -0.005 -0.023 -0.385 0.017 0.156 -0.006 
 (0.026) (0.034) (0.635) (0.033) (0.146) (0.070) (0.134) (0.029) (0.015) (0.031) (0.068) (0.077) (0.392) (0.214) (0.413) (0.095) 
MajGov -0.071** -0.036 0.345 -0.007 -0.226* 0.165*** -0.029 -0.057** -0.006 0.020 -0.078 0.047 -0.751* -0.058 -0.693 -0.122 
 (0.030) (0.038) (0.548) (0.039) (0.136) (0.064) (0.151) (0.029) (0.019) (0.033) (0.074) (0.081) (0.396) (0.233) (0.537) (0.098) 
                  
Notes: See Tables 1 to 4. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and  
*, 10%. Only the estimated coefficients for the political variables are presented here, but all regressions were estimated wi th the same covariates as in the 
baseline model. The estimates for the coefficients on the other control variables are available upon request. The lack of variability in the data makes it 
impossible to run the model for TransfGen, (in Public Services), OthDef (in Defence), PubOrdRD (in Public Order), OthHous for Nordic countries (in 
Housing), OthHlth (in Health), OthEduc (in Education) and OthRecr (in Recreation). Country and time effects are controlled for in all estimations. 
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Table 6. Opportunistic effects in the ratios between the public expenditure components 
 PubServ Defence PubOrder EconAff Environm Housing Health Recreat Educ SocProtect TotExpd 
            
PubServ -- 0.031* 0.021 0.045* 0.034** 0.027 0.020* 0.022* 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 
 -- (0.016) (0.018) (0.025) (0.016) (0.034) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Defence  -- -0.002 0.016 0.005 0.001 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.011 -0.007 
  -- (0.029) (0.031) (0.022) (0.037) (0.020) (0.020) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
PubOrder   -- 0.012 0.002 0.001 -0.009 -0.013 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 
   -- (0.025) (0.018) (0.032) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) 
EconAff    -- -0.008 -0.011 -0.025 -0.028 -0.022 -0.024 -0.020 
    -- (0.028) (0.039) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.021) 
Environm     -- -0.003 -0.013 -0.011 -0.014 -0.016 -0.012 
     -- (0.032) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Housing      -- -0.011 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.009 
      -- (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) 
Health       -- 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
       -- (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Recreat        -- 0.001 -0.002 0.002 
        -- (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Educ         -- -0.004 0.001 
         -- (0.005) (0.005) 
SocProtect          -- 0.004 
          -- (0.005) 
TotExpd           -- 
           -- 
            
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. Each line presents the electoral effect (ElectYr coefficient, where each regression was estimated 
with the same covariates as in the baseline model) for the logarithm of the ratio of the respective component to each of the 
other components that are in each column. The estimates for the coefficients on the other regressors are not reported here 
to save space, but they are available upon request. Country and time effects are controlled for in all estimations. 
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Table A.1. Description of the Variables 
Variable Description 
  
TotExpd Total general government expenditure, real values (base year: 2005). 
PubServ General public services, which comprises the following items: (i) Executive and legislative organs, 
financial and fiscal affairs, and external affairs (ExecAff); (ii) Foreign economic aid (ForAid); (iii) 
General services (GServ); (iv) Basic research (BasicRD); (v) R&D general public services (GServRD); 
(vi) Other general public services (OthServ); (vii) Public debt transactions (DebtTRS); (viii) Transfers of 
a general character between different levels of government (TransfGen). 
Defence Defence expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) Military defence (MilDef); (ii) Civil 
defence (CivDef); (iii) Foreign military aid (FMilAid); (iv) R&D defence (DefRD); (v) Other defence 
expenditures (OthDef). 
PubOrder Public order and safety, which comprises the following items: (i) Police services (Police); (ii) Fire-
protection services (Fire); (iii) Law courts (Courts); (iv) Prisons (Prisions); (v) R&D public order and 
safety (PubOrdRD); (vi) Other public order and safety expenditures (OthPO). 
EconAff Economic affairs expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) General economic, commercial 
and labour affairs (GenAff); (ii) Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting (Agric); (iii) Fuel and energy 
(Energy); (iv) Mining, manufacturing and construction (Constr); (v) Transport (Transp); (vi) 
Communication (Communic); (vii) Other industries (OthInd); (vii) R&D economic affairs (EAffRD); (ix) 
Other economic affairs expenditures (OthEAff). 
Environm Environmental protection expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) Waste management 
(Waste); (ii) Waste water management (WastWater); (iii) Pollution abatement (Pollut); (iv) Protection of 
biodiversity and landscape (Protect); (v) R&D environmental protection (EnvirRD); (vi) Other 
environmental protection expenditures (OthEnvir). 
Housing Housing and community amenities, which comprises the following items: (i) Housing development 
(HousDev); (ii) Community development (ComDev); (iii) Water supply (WatSup); (iv) Street lighting 
(StrLight); (v) R&D housing and community amenities (HousRD); (vi) Other housing and community 
amenities expenditures (OthHous). 
Health Health expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) Medical products, appliances and 
equipment (MedProd); (ii) Outpatient services (OutPServ); (iii) Hospital services (HospServ); (iv) Public 
health services (PubHlth); (v) R&D health (HlthRD); (vi) Other health expenditures (OthHlth). 
Recreat Recreation, culture and religion expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) Recreational and 
sporting services (Sports); (ii) Cultural services (Culture); (iii) Broadcasting and publishing services 
(Broadcast); (iv) Religious and other community services (Religious); (v) R&D recreation, culture and 
religion (RecrRD); (vi) Other recreation, culture and religion expenditures (OthRecr). 
Educ Education expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) Pre-primary and primary education 
(Prim); (ii) Secundary education (Second); (iii) Post-secundary non-tertiary education (PosSec); (iv) 
Tertiary Education (Tert); (v) General education expenditures not defined by level (Genr); (vi) 
Subsidiary services to education (SubServ); (vi) R&D education (EducRD); (viii) Other education 
expenditures (OthEduc). 
SocProtect Social protection expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) Sickness and disability 
(SickDis); (ii) Old age (Olders); (iii) Survivors (Survivors); (iv) Family and children (Family); (v) 
Unemployment protection (UnemPrt); (vi) Housing protection (HousPrt); (vii) Social exclusion 
(SocExcl); (viii) R&D social protection (SocPrtRD); (ix) Other social protection expenditures (OthSocP). 
ElectYr Dummy variable that takes de value of 1 in the year of legislative elections; 0 otherwise. 
LeftGov Dummy variable that takes de value of 1 when there is hegemony or dominance of left-wing parties in 
the cabinet; 0 otherwise. 
MajGov Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a single party or coalition has majority in the parliament; 
0 otherwise.  
GDPpc Real GDP per capita (constant prices, base year: 2005) 
RelPr Relative prices computed as the ratio of the government final consumption deflator to the GDP deflator. 
Pop Population, in thousands. 
  
Notes: All government expenditure components are in real values (base year: 2005). 
Sources: OECD (2009), Government at a Glance; Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database); Comparative 
Political Data Set I (http://www.cpds-data.org/). 
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Table A.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
      
TotExpdpc 365 13.915 5.299 4.381 32.934 
PubServpc 365 2.009 0.662 0.777 3.727 
Defencepc 365 0.415 0.236 0.003 1.109 
PubOrderpc 365 0.433 0.152 0.002 1.088 
EconAffpc 365 1.380 0.731 0.127 7.985 
Environmpc 365 0.225 0.165 0.022 0.855 
Housingpc 365 0.240 0.166 0.020 1.517 
Healthpc 365 1.868 0.835 0.130 5.552 
Recreatpc 365 0.372 0.254 0.010 1.465 
Educpc 365 1.665 0.758 0.356 4.155 
SocProtectpc 365 5.307 2.430 1.028 13.217 
ElectYr 414 0.261 0.440 0 1 
LeftGov 414 0.264 0.441 0 1 
MajGov 414 0.742 0.438 0 1 
GDPpc 414 37.849 12.042 20.257 90.975 
RelPr 408 0.941 0.073 0.739 1.073 
Pop 414 21765.280 24942.880 254.800 82502.000 
      
Notes: All the government expenditures and GDP are in thousands of Euros per capita (in real values, base year: 2005); 
RelPr is a ratio; and the total population is in thousands. Time period: 1990-2012 (annual data); Countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
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Table A.3. Sensitivity analysis I: Electoral timing 
Log of (p.c.) TotExpd PubServ Defence PubOrder EconAff Environm Housing Health Recreat Educ SocProtect 
Before (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
YrBefElect 0.005 0.009 -0.006 0.014 0.035 0.011 0.047 -0.004 0.020 0.002 -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.019) (0.026) (0.017) (0.036) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.006) 
ElectYr 0.012** 0.033*** 0.003 0.010 -0.001 0.003 0.017 0.011 0.018 0.013** 0.015** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.017) (0.018) (0.025) (0.017) (0.034) (0.011) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) 
LeftGov 0.001 0.000 -0.008 -0.034 -0.009 0.032* 0.056 0.007 0.011 0.017* 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.020) (0.037) (0.018) (0.036) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) 
MajGov 0.008 0.019 -0.002 -0.015 0.015 0.013 0.006 0.007 0.004 -0.004 0.014 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.028) (0.058) (0.019) (0.021) (0.013) (0.011) 
LnGDPpc 0.141*** 0.002 0.204* 0.667*** 0.120 0.436*** 0.418* 0.456*** 0.440*** 0.193*** 0.023 
 (0.046) (0.051) (0.123) (0.137) (0.182) (0.122) (0.247) (0.091) (0.093) (0.051) (0.044) 
LnRelPr 0.001 0.021 0.066 -0.013 0.242 -0.145 -0.186 -0.060 -0.199 0.010 0.031 
 (0.085) (0.093) (0.230) (0.218) (0.334) (0.206) (0.435) (0.138) (0.152) (0.092) (0.075) 
LnPop -0.253** 0.147 -0.572* 0.254 0.600 -0.662** -0.278 -0.262 -0.531** -0.549*** -0.041 
 (0.126) (0.121) (0.294) (0.306) (0.550) (0.279) (0.592) (0.195) (0.216) (0.135) (0.110) 
DepVar(-1) 0.933*** 0.943*** 0.829*** 0.362*** 0.529*** 0.797*** 0.491*** 0.720*** 0.794*** 0.951*** 0.948*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.041) (0.034) (0.050) (0.036) (0.049) (0.032) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025) 
Before 12m (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
Bef12Elect 0.018* 0.023** 0.032 0.001 0.042 -0.007 0.030 0.001 0.014 0.011* 0.017** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.024) (0.027) (0.037) (0.024) (0.050) (0.016) (0.018) (0.006) (0.008) 
LeftGov 0.001 -0.003 -0.009 -0.034 -0.006 0.033* 0.058 0.006 0.011 0.016* 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.020) (0.038) (0.018) (0.036) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) 
MajGov 0.009 0.021 0.001 -0.016 0.015 0.011 0.005 0.007 0.003 -0.004 0.014 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.028) (0.058) (0.019) (0.021) (0.013) (0.011) 
LnGDPpc 0.140*** 0.002 0.199 0.669*** 0.113 0.438*** 0.415* 0.457*** 0.441*** 0.192*** 0.024 
 (0.046) (0.053) (0.123) (0.137) (0.182) (0.122) (0.248) (0.091) (0.093) (0.051) (0.045) 
LnRelPr 0.003 0.019 0.081 -0.020 0.250 -0.151 -0.194 -0.062 -0.206 0.010 0.030 
 (0.085) (0.097) (0.229) (0.217) (0.336) (0.206) (0.435) (0.138) (0.152) (0.092) (0.076) 
LnPop -0.250** 0.150 -0.573* 0.261 0.633 -0.656** -0.248 -0.263 -0.520** -0.548*** -0.040 
 (0.126) (0.125) (0.293) (0.306) (0.550) (0.278) (0.592) (0.195) (0.216) (0.134) (0.110) 
DepVar(-1) 0.933*** 0.939*** 0.826*** 0.362*** 0.524*** 0.796*** 0.491*** 0.720*** 0.794*** 0.952*** 0.947*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.041) (0.034) (0.050) (0.036) (0.049) (0.032) (0.030) (0.025) (0.026) 
After (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
YrAftElect -0.004 -0.003 0.014 -0.003 0.003 -0.006 -0.024 -0.008 -0.015 -0.013* -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.019) (0.027) (0.017) (0.036) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.006) 
LeftGov 0.001 -0.003 -0.008 -0.033 -0.007 0.033* 0.058 0.006 0.011 0.016* 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.020) (0.038) (0.018) (0.036) (0.012) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) 
MajGov 0.007 0.020 -0.001 -0.016 0.012 0.011 0.002 0.007 0.001 -0.005 0.013 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.029) (0.059) (0.019) (0.021) (0.013) (0.011) 
LnGDPpc 0.142*** 0.004 0.204* 0.669*** 0.121 0.437*** 0.421* 0.455*** 0.442*** 0.191*** 0.023 
 (0.046) (0.053) (0.123) (0.137) (0.182) (0.122) (0.248) (0.091) (0.093) (0.051) (0.044) 
LnRelPr -0.004 0.014 0.067 -0.020 0.233 -0.148 -0.206 -0.063 -0.212 0.006 0.029 
 (0.085) (0.097) (0.230) (0.217) (0.334) (0.206) (0.435) (0.138) (0.152) (0.091) (0.075) 
LnPop -0.252** 0.149 -0.582** 0.262 0.621 -0.651** -0.235 -0.259 -0.517** -0.544*** -0.039 
 (0.126) (0.125) (0.294) (0.306) (0.553) (0.279) (0.595) (0.195) (0.216) (0.134) (0.109) 
DepVar(-1) 0.935*** 0.939*** 0.829*** 0.362*** 0.526*** 0.796*** 0.490*** 0.721*** 0.796*** 0.955*** 0.949*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.041) (0.034) (0.050) (0.036) (0.049) (0.031) (0.030) (0.025) (0.026) 
Timing (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectTiming 0.019* 0.034*** -0.006 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.047 0.013 0.025 0.020** 0.018** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.027) (0.029) (0.037) (0.026) (0.054) (0.018) (0.020) (0.010) (0.008) 
LeftGov 0.001 -0.002 -0.009 -0.033 -0.007 0.033* 0.059 0.006 0.011 0.016* 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.020) (0.037) (0.018) (0.036) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) 
MajGov 0.008 0.020 -0.002 -0.016 0.012 0.012 0.003 0.007 0.002 -0.004 0.014 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.028) (0.058) (0.019) (0.021) (0.013) (0.011) 
LnGDPpc 0.141*** 0.001 0.205* 0.669*** 0.120 0.436*** 0.416* 0.455*** 0.441*** 0.192*** 0.022 
 (0.046) (0.052) (0.123) (0.137) (0.182) (0.122) (0.248) (0.091) (0.093) (0.051) (0.044) 
LnRelPr -0.001 0.024 0.066 -0.018 0.234 -0.147 -0.195 -0.059 -0.206 0.010 0.033 
 (0.085) (0.095) (0.229) (0.217) (0.333) (0.205) (0.434) (0.138) (0.151) (0.091) (0.075) 
LnPop -0.251** 0.148 -0.575* 0.262 0.625 -0.653** -0.242 -0.261 -0.518** -0.546*** -0.040 
 (0.126) (0.123) (0.294) (0.306) (0.552) (0.279) (0.594) (0.195) (0.216) (0.134) (0.109) 
DepVar(-1) 0.934*** 0.944*** 0.829*** 0.362*** 0.526*** 0.796*** 0.490*** 0.721*** 0.794*** 0.952*** 0.949*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.041) (0.034) (0.050) (0.036) (0.049) (0.032) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025) 
            
            
No. Observ. 341 341 341 341 339 341 341 341 341 341 341 
No. Countr. 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
            
Notes: See Table 1. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 
10%. Bef12Elect a pre-election variable measuring the part of a year that is within 12 months before an election. Electoral timing is a variable that 
measures the proportion of time a government is in office in a particular year, since it has been elected (until the next election); it is equal to 1 in the 
election year. Variables for the interactions between ElectYr and LeftGov, MajGov and Unemp were also considered in other regressions, but the 
respective coefficients were always statistically insignificant. Those results are not reported here to save space, but they are available upon request. 
Country and time effects are controlled for in all estimations. 
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Table A.4. Sensitivity analysis II: Political orientation, political support, unemployment and population 
Log of (p.c.) TotExpd PubServ Defence PubOrder EconAff Environm Housing Health Recreat Educ SocProtect 
Orientation 
& Support 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectYr 0.0012* 0.027*** 0.002 0.003 -0.017 -0.001 0.004 0.010 0.005 0.013* 0.016** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0.017) (0.035) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.006) 
Partisan1 -0.006 0.011 0.015 0.049* -0.028 -0.044* -0.105** -0.014 -0.023 -0.019* 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.024) (0.025) (0.042) (0.023) (0.045) (0.016) (0.017) (0.011) (0.008) 
Partisan2 0.011 0.036** 0.018 0.059 0.054 -0.024 -0.042 0.015 0.018 -0.020 0.002 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.038) (0.042) (0.065) (0.038) (0.077) (0.026) (0.029) (0.017) (0.014) 
Partisan3 -0.010 0.028* 0.015 0.027 -0.034 -0.044 -0.121* -0.028 -0.010 -0.025 -0.018 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.035) (0.036) (0.049) (0.034) (0.067) (0.023) (0.025) (0.015) (0.013) 
Partisan4 -0.018 0.042** 0.016 0.016 -0.110* -0.043 -0.160* -0.025 -0.018 -0.011 -0.001 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.044) (0.045) (0.059) (0.042) (0.085) (0.028) (0.031) (0.019) (0.016) 
GovSup>50% 0.006 0.010 -0.010 -0.004 0.047 0.005 -0.009 0.015 0.012 -0.005 0.007 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.032) (0.034) (0.039) (0.031) (0.064) (0.021) (0.023) (0.014) (0.011) 
LnGDPpc 0.154*** 0.005 0.200* 0.660*** 0.185 0.452*** 0.463* 0.466*** 0.460*** 0.192*** 0.019 
 (0.044) (0.051) (0.120) (0.134) (0.175) (0.119) (0.242) (0.088) (0.092) (0.049) (0.042) 
LnRelPr -0.047 0.012 0.078 -0.031 -0.011 -0.228 -0.437 -0.127 -0.277* -0.002 0.015 
 (0.087) (0.095) (0.233) (0.226) (0.341) (0.213) (0.446) (0.143) (0.157) (0.094) (0.076) 
LnPop -0.256** 0.126 -0.582* 0.227 0.549 -0.631** -0.147 -0.287 -0.562** -0.541*** -0.049 
 (0.129) (0.128) (0.300) (0.310) (0.530) (0.283) (0.600) (0.197) (0.219) (0.138) (0.114) 
DepVar(-1) 0.931*** 0.931*** 0.829*** 0.361*** 0.522*** 0.800*** 0.480*** 0.719*** 0.794*** 0.953*** 0.954*** 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.040) (0.034) (0.051) (0.035) (0.045) (0.031) (0.029) (0.025) (0.024) 
            
            
No. Observ. 341 341 341 341 339 341 341 341 341 341 341 
No.Countr. 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
            
            
Unemp & 
Population 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectYr 0.011* 0.036*** 0.005 0.007 -0.009 0.002 0.008 0.015 0.013 0.012* 0.016*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.016) (0.017) (0.025) (0.015) (0.032) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) 
LeftGov -0.003 0.006 -0.018 -0.010 -0.010 0.013 0.031 0.010 0.005 0.011 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.018) (0.019) (0.036) (0.017) (0.034) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) 
MajGov 0.006 0.027** -0.008 0.027 0.012 -0.006 -0.026 0.016 0.001 -0.005 0.014 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.027) (0.055) (0.018) (0.019) (0.012) (0.010) 
Unemp -0.006*** 0.003*** -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.010** -0.014*** -0.022*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
LnRelPr 0.030 0.118 0.040 0.951*** 0.760** 0.057 0.030 0.228* 0.032 0.060 0.024 
 (0.073) (0.085) (0.203) (0.210) (0.321) (0.197) (0.372) (0.132) (0.143) (0.079) (0.066) 
Young 0.006 0.003 0.008 0.017 -0.034* -0.034*** -0.083*** 0.010 -0.003 0.016*** 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.013) (0.027) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) 
Elderly 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.011 -0.054*** -0.026** -0.081*** 0.007 -0.004 0.007 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.011) (0.022) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) 
DepVar(-1) 0.957*** 0.945*** 0.815*** 0.431*** 0.504*** 0.766*** 0.385*** 0.801*** 0.830*** 0.948*** 0.967*** 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.037) (0.031) (0.047) (0.032) (0.047) (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) 
            
            
No. Observ. 341 341 341 341 339 341 341 341 341 341 341 
No.Countr. 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
            
Notes: See Table 1. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. Variables for the interactions between LeftGov, MajGov (or GovSup>50%) and 
Unemp (unemployment rate) were also considered in other regressions, but the respective coefficients were always 
statistically insignificant. Those results are not reported here, but they are available upon request.  Country and time effects 
are controlled for in all estimations. 
 
 
  41 
 
Table A.5. Additional robustness checks I: EMU and non-EMU-countries, before and after the Euro 
Log of (p.c.) TotExpd PubServ Defence PubOrder EconAff Environm Housing Health Recreat Educ SocProtect 
EMU (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectYr 0.014** 0.028*** 0.009 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.044 0.016 0.013 0.013** 0.014*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.019) (0.027) (0.018) (0.035) (0.012) (0.013) (0.006) (0.005) 
LeftGov 0.001 -0.009 0.001 -0.079 -0.007 0.010 0.040 0.030 0.002 0.007 0.007 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.030) (0.049) (0.047) (0.032) (0.061) (0.022) (0.025) (0.012) (0.009) 
MajGov 0.006 0.017 -0.006 -0.052 0.006 -0.014 -0.044 -0.003 -0.032 -0.012 0.013 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.030) (0.034) (0.048) (0.033) (0.062) (0.022) (0.024) (0.012) (0.009) 
LnGDPpc 0.164*** -0.023 0.043 0.509*** -0.020 0.562*** 0.641** 0.550*** 0.522*** 0.247*** 0.044 
 (0.056) (0.050) (0.140) (0.154) (0.222) (0.154) (0.287) (0.108) (0.117) (0.060) (0.040) 
LnRelPr 0.203** 0.167* 0.457* 0.404 0.204 -0.337 -0.360 0.461** 0.084 0.176* 0.184** 
 (0.104) (0.098) (0.267) (0.295) (0.425) (0.272) (0.528) (0.199) (0.210) (0.104) (0.076) 
LnPop 0.308** 0.103 -0.446* 0.798*** 1.538*** -0.136 -0.462 0.132 -0.236 -0.301*** 0.189** 
 (0.122) (0.109) (0.257) (0.293) (0.462) (0.270) (0.534) (0.197) (0.210) (0.108) (0.085) 
DepVar(-1) 0.668*** 0.958*** 0.729*** 0.269*** 0.393*** 0.665*** 0.512*** 0.479*** 0.667*** 0.804*** 0.841*** 
 (0.044) (0.033) (0.052) (0.031) (0.057) (0.042) (0.047) (0.041) (0.035) (0.033) (0.031) 
            
No. Observ. 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 
No. Countr. 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
            
            
Non-EMU (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectYr 0.003 0.046** -0.019 0.017 -0.061 -0.028 -0.087 0.011 0.013 0.007 0.019 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.034) (0.018) (0.039) (0.030) (0.067) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.017) 
LeftGov -0.005 0.018 -0.036 0.007 -0.011 0.059** 0.088 0.007 0.012 0.020 -0.001 
 (0.013) (0.024) (0.037) (0.016) (0.055) (0.029) (0.061) (0.014) (0.021) (0.015) (0.017) 
MajGov 0.019 0.028 0.035 0.023 0.056 0.109* 0.153 0.005 0.074* 0.010 0.024 
 (0.025) (0.035) (0.064) (0.030) (0.084) (0.056) (0.116) (0.028) (0.039) (0.029) (0.029) 
LnGDPpc 0.142 0.089 0.665** 0.210 0.615 0.308 -0.260 0.038 0.187 0.132 -0.048 
 (0.122) (0.148) (0.263) (0.161) (0.406) (0.226) (0.508) (0.130) (0.185) (0.152) (0.150) 
LnRelPr -0.161 -0.273 -0.617 -0.156 0.117 0.207 0.019 -0.136 -0.052 -0.166 -0.085 
 (0.212) (0.274) (0.505) (0.258) (0.772) (0.476) (0.858) (0.228) (0.339) (0.242) (0.242) 
LnPop -0.598** 0.095 -1.978*** -0.872** -1.450 -1.692*** 0.242 -0.690** -1.131** -0.864** -0.275 
 (0.301) (0.409) (0.738) (0.355) (1.411) (0.603) (1.395) (0.348) (0.474) (0.343) (0.343) 
DepVar(-1) 1.024*** 0.866*** 0.975*** 1.005*** 0.789*** 0.899*** 0.366*** 1.061*** 1.011*** 1.031*** 1.005*** 
 (0.069) (0.096) (0.087) (0.075) (0.103) (0.077) (0.104) (0.046) (0.083) (0.065) (0.079) 
            
No. Observ. 104 104 104 104 102 104 104 104 104 104 104 
No. Countr. 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
            
            
1990-1998 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectYr 0.023* 0.029** 0.026 -0.006 -0.011 0.023 0.027 0.019 0.003 0.031** 0.023** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.032) (0.034) (0.038) (0.039) (0.061) (0.026) (0.026) (0.014) (0.010) 
LeftGov 0.036* 0.003 0.014 -0.013 0.041 0.085 -0.064 0.067 0.087** 0.059** 0.041** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.054) (0.059) (0.067) (0.064) (0.098) (0.042) (0.043) (0.024) (0.018) 
MajGov 0.044* 0.047* 0.089 0.101 0.028 0.013 0.115 0.052 0.023 0.046 0.034 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.069) (0.076) (0.089) (0.089) (0.134) (0.056) (0.057) (0.031) (0.022) 
LnGDPpc 0.254 0.022 0.086 0.678 0.244 0.856 1.238 0.702 0.746* 0.248 0.047 
 (0.186) (0.204) (0.494) (0.564) (0.668) (0.647) (0.978) (0.432) (0.419) (0.212) (0.153) 
LnRelPr -0.143 -0.013 0.089 -0.512 0.388 0.031 -1.428 0.277 -0.521 0.470 0.043 
 (0.391) (0.429) (1.043) (1.194) (1.375) (1.443) (2.139) (0.878) (0.910) (0.456) (0.325) 
LnPop -0.505 0.889 0.014 1.045 -2.439 -2.051 -2.528 -0.006 -0.346 -0.313 0.268 
 (0.921) (1.056) (2.500) (2.590) (3.111) (3.129) (4.587) (1.907) (1.963) (0.992) (0.736) 
DepVar(-1) 0.765*** 1.042*** 0.483*** 0.076* 0.402*** 0.598*** 0.268*** 0.327*** 0.493*** 0.769*** 0.724*** 
 (0.067) (0.084) (0.099) (0.042) (0.103) (0.080) (0.096) (0.076) (0.064) (0.055) (0.059) 
            
            
No. Observ. 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
No. Countr. 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
            
            
1999-2012 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectYr 0.013* 0.034*** -0.012 0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.013 0.014 0.012 0.017* 0.016* 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.021) (0.011) (0.030) (0.016) (0.046) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) 
LeftGov -0.002 0.007 -0.014 0.009 -0.032 0.008 0.097 0.010 0.003 0.015 0.002 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.031) (0.017) (0.040) (0.023) (0.067) (0.016) (0.022) (0.015) (0.013) 
MajGov -0.004 0.005 -0.035 0.008 0.003 -0.027 0.007 -0.008 0.001 -0.013 0.000 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.039) (0.019) (0.068) (0.027) (0.082) (0.017) (0.025) (0.017) (0.015) 
LnGDPpc 0.104 0.089 0.337 0.094 0.301 0.261* 0.548 0.124 0.381*** 0.132 -0.080 
 (0.088) (0.099) (0.212) (0.111) (0.401) (0.153) (0.493) (0.099) (0.142) (0.093) (0.083) 
LnRelPr 0.038 0.095 -0.280 0.030 0.357 -0.390* 0.562 -0.057 -0.026 -0.032 0.128 
 (0.124) (0.141) (0.308) (0.157) (0.464) (0.220) (0.653) (0.140) (0.201) (0.130) (0.117) 
LnPop -0.366** 0.039 -0.357 -0.541*** 0.298 -0.516* -1.120 -0.645*** -0.909*** -0.588*** -0.193 
 (0.173) (0.190) (0.384) (0.193) (0.803) (0.263) (0.862) (0.181) (0.284) (0.166) (0.164) 
DepVar(-1) 0.999*** 0.920*** 0.898*** 0.940*** 0.534*** 0.927*** 0.495*** 1.012*** 0.961*** 1.015*** 1.008*** 
 (0.038) (0.045) (0.050) (0.022) (0.083) (0.037) (0.068) (0.025) (0.032) (0.033) (0.040) 
            
            
No. Observ. 226 226 226 226 224 226 226 226 226 226 226 
No. Countr. 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
            
Notes: See Table 1. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. In 
the first set of estimations, we distinguish between those countries that took part in the European and Monetary Union (EMU) and the others that do not; in the 
second set of regressions, and according to our sample period, we restrict the analysis to the periods before (1990-1998) and after (1999-2012) the introduction 
of the Euro. Time effects are controlled for in all estimations. 
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Table A.6. Additional robustness checks II: EU-countries, before financial crisis (1990-2007), and BCFE estimator 
Log of (p.c.) TotExpd PubServ Defence PubOrder EconAff Environm Housing Health Recreat Educ SocProtect 
EU (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectYr 0.016** 0.030*** 0.013 0.008 0.002 0.005 0.033 0.015 0.014 0.015** 0.015** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.035) (0.013) (0.014) (0.008) (0.006) 
LeftGov 0.019* -0.005 0.022 -0.021 0.039 0.050* 0.053 0.031* 0.021 0.024** 0.011 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.027) (0.030) (0.036) (0.029) (0.051) (0.018) (0.021) (0.012) (0.009) 
MajGov 0.007 0.013 -0.008 -0.039 0.018 0.009 -0.021 -0.006 -0.014 -0.009 0.013 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.028) (0.033) (0.048) (0.032) (0.056) (0.020) (0.023) (0.012) (0.009) 
LnGDPpc 0.158*** -0.028 0.066 0.572*** 0.002 0.520*** 0.494* 0.544*** 0.476*** 0.241*** 0.039 
 (0.054) (0.060) (0.132) (0.155) (0.153) (0.155) (0.265) (0.099) (0.109) (0.057) (0.044) 
LnRelPr 0.153 0.090 0.299 0.367 0.486 -0.011 -0.226 0.382** -0.101 0.109 0.109 
 (0.095) (0.105) (0.242) (0.279) (0.334) (0.269) (0.476) (0.169) (0.184) (0.098) (0.076) 
LnPop 0.115 0.157 -0.430* 0.529** 1.100** -0.532** -0.600 0.083 -0.323* -0.380*** 0.209** 
 (0.111) (0.124) (0.236) (0.268) (0.521) (0.258) (0.475) (0.161) (0.182) (0.106) (0.093) 
DepVar(-1) 0.747*** 0.955*** 0.751*** 0.301*** 0.447*** 0.711*** 0.588*** 0.521*** 0.728*** 0.844*** 0.844*** 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.038) (0.032) (0.055) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) 
            
No. Observ. 298 298 298 298 296 298 298 298 298 298 298 
No. Countr. 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
            
            
1990-2007 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectYr 0.020*** 0.034*** 0.000 0.002 0.020 -0.000 0.008 0.013 0.012 0.014* 0.015** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.041) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.007) 
LeftGov 0.012 -0.002 0.017 -0.031 0.036 0.061** 0.033 0.027 0.022 0.020* 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.026) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.053) (0.019) (0.020) (0.011) (0.009) 
MajGov 0.016* 0.029** 0.017 -0.000 0.028 0.019 0.017 0.034* -0.014 0.001 0.023** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.028) (0.035) (0.048) (0.032) (0.058) (0.021) (0.022) (0.012) (0.010) 
LnGDPpc 0.154*** 0.021 0.017 0.584*** 0.012 0.550*** 0.263 0.680*** 0.417*** 0.214*** 0.050 
 (0.053) (0.068) (0.155) (0.197) (0.261) (0.177) (0.341) (0.125) (0.127) (0.065) (0.058) 
LnRelPr 0.035 0.026 0.404 0.451 0.318 0.157 -0.453 0.135 -0.110 0.123 0.075 
 (0.083) (0.112) (0.248) (0.318) (0.345) (0.308) (0.517) (0.195) (0.206) (0.102) (0.086) 
LnPop -0.086 0.062 -0.227 0.735 0.957 -0.865 0.745 -0.161 0.184 -0.482** 0.229 
 (0.171) (0.229) (0.510) (0.659) (0.964) (0.607) (1.163) (0.392) (0.424) (0.206) (0.172) 
DepVar(-1) 0.841*** 0.960*** 0.838*** 0.255*** 0.437*** 0.698*** 0.511*** 0.502*** 0.692*** 0.887*** 0.838*** 
 (0.035) (0.038) (0.050) (0.037) (0.054) (0.044) (0.055) (0.041) (0.037) (0.032) (0.034) 
            
            
No. Observ. 253 253 253 253 251 253 253 253 253 253 253 
No. Countr. 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
            
            
BCFE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
ElectYr 0.011** 0.037*** 0.003 0.005 -0.009 -0.001 0.004 0.013 0.012 0.012** 0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.031) (0.015) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) 
LeftGov -0.000 -0.000 -0.009 -0.043 -0.024 0.025 0.051* 0.004 0.010 0.014 0.003 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.030) (0.046) (0.052) (0.036) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.015) (0.015) 
MajGov 0.004 0.019*** 0.001 -0.015 0.008 0.004 0.007 0.003 -0.002 -0.010 0.014 
 (0.017) (0.004) (0.038) (0.021) (0.026) (0.017) (0.068) (0.023) (0.020) (0.011) (0.010) 
LnGDPpc 0.194** 0.070 0.183* 0.664** 0.122 0.443*** 0.378 0.476* 0.437*** 0.243*** 0.139** 
 (0.092) (0.043) (0.100) (0.283) (0.227) (0.137) (0.535) (0.287) (0.115) (0.059) (0.065) 
LnRelPr -0.080 -0.061 -0.040 0.006 0.031 -0.143 -0.238 -0.087 -0.238 -0.061 -0.057 
 (0.148) (0.085) (0.272) (0.331) (0.844) (0.387) (0.454) (0.270) (0.317) (0.108) (0.125) 
LnPop -0.276 0.097 -0.546 0.235 0.668 -0.604 -0.160 -0.260 -0.479* -0.498* -0.054 
 (0.409) (0.106) (0.402) (0.795) (0.876) (0.491) (0.602) (0.430) (0.261) (0.292) (0.252) 
DepVar(-1) 0.966*** 1.010*** 0.812*** 0.355 0.508*** 0.777*** 0.471*** 0.710*** 0.796*** 0.997*** 0.995*** 
 (0.143) (0.021) (0.101) (0.355) (0.104) (0.126) (0.142) (0.210) (0.156) (0.086) (0.109) 
            
            
No. Observ. 341 341 341 341 330 341 341 341 341 341 341 
No. Countr. 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
            
Notes: See Table 1. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 
10%. In the first set of estimations, we consider only the group of European Union (EU) countries in our sample; in the second set, we restrict the 
analysis to the period before the recent great financial crisis: 1990-2007. In the last set of estimations, we employ the bootstrap-based bias-corrected 
fixed effects (BCFE) estimator developed by Vos et al. (2015); 250 bootstrap iterations were used for the construction of the bias-corrected FE 
estimator; standard errors are also bootstrapped and are then used to calculate confidence intervals using the Student t-distribution; the residuals to be 
used in the bootstrap procedure (resampling scheme) are drawn from the normal distribution with estimated homogeneous variance. Time effects are 
controlled for in all estimations. 
 
